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Are Successive Generations 
Getting Wealthier, and If So, Why?
Evidence from the 1990s
THE 1990S WERE a remarkable decade for saving and wealth accumulation.
After averaging 3.4 times GDP between 1950 and 1990, aggregate net
worth rose from 3.5 times GDP in 1990 to 4.2 times GDP in 2000, its high-
est level since at least 1950. In nominal dollar terms, net worth rose from
$20 trillion in 1990 to $42 trillion in 2000. Much of the increase in wealth
was fueled by skyrocketing capital gains in the stock market, which helped
boost the aggregate market value of equities from $3 trillion in 1990 to
$15 trillion in 2000. The decade also saw widespread diffusion of stock
ownership (directly and indirectly through mutual funds) and substantial
increases in participation in and contributions to defined-contribution pen-
sion plans, typically 401(k)s. At the same time, however, the measured
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saving rate, excluding capital gains, fell over the decade, continuing a
longer-term pattern.1
These patterns created a rich environment in which to examine house-
hold saving and wealth accumulation. Previous researchers have followed
particular birth cohorts through the 1990s, separating the wealth changes
that each cohort experienced into a component due to capital gains and a
component due to active saving. These studies aimed to develop estimates
of the age-wealth and age-saving profile, and to determine among which
birth cohorts and among which types of assets wealth rose and active sav-
ing fell during the 1990s. Other studies have examined the extent to which
households chose to use their accumulated capital gains in the 1990s to
finance increased consumption expenditure or early retirement.2
This paper also focuses on the 1990s but addresses a different set of
questions and thus takes a different approach to the data. Unlike previous
studies, ours does not focus on tracking particular birth cohorts through
time. Instead we examine the relative wealth status of different birth
cohorts as they reach similar stages of the life cycle. Thus, for example, we
compare (using data from the 1989–2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances)
the 2001 wealth of households where the head was between the ages of
65 and 74 in 2001 with the 1989 wealth of households where the head was
between 65 and 74 in 1989. The idea behind this type of comparison is to
exploit the fact that households of a given age in 1989 had not experienced
the 1990s, whereas households of the same age, observed in 2001, had.
Thus, by controlling for other factors that may vary across generations—
such as educational attainment, marital status, health status, and differing
work norms for women—we can measure the effects of exposure to the
1990s on saving and wealth.
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1. For data on aggregate wealth and equities, see Flow of Funds Accounts of the United
States: Annual Flows and Outstandings 1945–2004 Z.1, table F.6, line 1; table B.100, line 42;
and table B.100.e, line 6. For data on the diffusion of stock ownership and of 401(k) plans,
see Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003), Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1994), and
Poterba and Samwick (1995, 1999). For evidence on the saving rate, see Gale and Sabelhaus
(1999), Bosworth and Bell (2005), and Sabelhaus and Schwabish (2006). To adjust the figures
in the text to generate real increases in net worth and capital gains, note that cumulative
inflation between 1990 and 2000 was 28 percent, as measured by the consumer price index
research series using current methods. For a discussion of overarching trends and the general
prosperity of the 1990s, see Blinder and Yellen (2001).
2. See Bosworth and Bell (2005), Coile and Levine (2004), Coronado and Perozek (2003),
Dynan and Maki (2001), Juster and others (2006), Maki and Palumbo (2001), Sabelhaus
and Schwabish (2006), and Sabelhaus and Pence (1999).
Our approach can provide insights regarding three questions: To what
extent are successive generations of American households wealthier than
their predecessors? What are the principal determinants of the trends in
wealth across successive generations? And what are the implications? The
answers to the first two questions turn out to be surprising and simple. The
answer to the third is more complex.
We find that the rise in aggregate net worth over the 1990s (that is,
the rise in net worth in 2001 relative to 1989) accrued almost entirely to
older age groups. Older households (those with heads aged 55–64, 65–74,
or 75–84 years) in 2001 had significantly more wealth than did similarly
aged households in 1989. For example, real median wealth among 65- to
74-year-olds in 2001 was about $100,000 (60 percent) greater than among
65- to 74-year-olds in 1989. For these older households, economically and
statistically significant increases in wealth occurred at almost all points in
the wealth distribution and across all major wealth categories: retirement
accounts, other financial assets, housing equity, and other real assets. In
contrast, the typical younger household (aged 25–34, 35–44, or 45–54) in
2001 did not have more wealth than a typical younger household in 1989.
We also show that, despite the large capital gains, the rapid diffusion of
stock ownership, and the significant increase in 401(k) participation and
contributions in the 1990s, the principal factor determining changes in
wealth across successive generations appears to be changes in household-
level demographic characteristics, and not changes in the relationship
between these characteristics and wealth. Informally, certain key demo-
graphic characteristics that affect wealth accumulation shifted substantially
across age groups in a manner consistent with the differing trends in wealth.
For example, compared with similarly aged households in 1989, older
households in 2001 were more likely to be married, more likely to report
their health as “excellent” or “good,” and more likely to contain men who
had completed postsecondary education. In contrast, for younger households
in 2001, each of these trends was reversed relative to similarly aged house-
holds in 1989. Formal regression and decomposition analysis shows even
more strongly that changes in demographic characteristics are closely tied
to changes in median wealth, mean wealth, and the distribution of wealth
between 1989 and 2001 for older generations. Indeed, information on house-
holds’ 2001 demographic characteristics and the relationship between those
characteristics and wealth that held in the 1989 sample predicts extremely
accurately the distribution of wealth in 2001, without any reference to
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changes in capital gains, stock ownership, or participation in defined-
contribution plans.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by describing
the data set. We then present trends across successive cohorts in wealth
holdings and demographic characteristics. Next we describe the various
tests and the econometric specifications we use to compare the wealth of
successive cohorts. We then present our main empirical findings. Next
we provide information on the role of capital gains, diffusion of stock
ownership, and pension coverage across successive cohorts. We con-
clude by discussing alternative interpretations and implications of the
results.
Data
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is designed specifically to
measure household wealth (net worth) and its components.3 To capture
how assets and debt are held broadly in the population, about two-thirds of
the unweighted sample are drawn from a stratified, nationally representa-
tive random sample. To capture the concentration of assets and debt among
high-wealth households, the remaining third are randomly selected from
statistical records derived from tax returns, using a stratification technique
that oversamples households likely to have substantial wealth. This sample
design allows for more efficient and less biased estimates of wealth than
are generally feasible through simpler designs.
Although the SCF has been conducted every three years since 1983, we
focus on the data from 1989 to 2001, a period during which the survey has
employed a consistent methodology. This period, of course, also brackets
the sharp increase in the ratio of aggregate net worth to GDP described
earlier. A key advantage of the SCF is that it covers all age groups and
almost all household assets and liabilities, financial and real, including
defined-benefit pension wealth. The only important exception is that house-
holds wealthy enough to be in the Forbes 400 are excluded. The main
drawback of the SCF is its relatively small sample size of approximately
4,000 households in each survey year.
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3. For an overview of the 2001 SCF, see Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003). For
an overview of the SCF sample design and survey methodology, see Kennickell (2005).
Our measures of net worth and its components follow the SCF defini-
tions except for the treatment of pension wealth. Because the SCF defines
net worth as resources that a household may access and control immedi-
ately, the survey’s definition of wealth excludes defined-benefit pensions
(which cannot be accessed until retirement) and includes only liquid
defined-contribution plans: 401(k)s, thrift plans, defined-contribution
plans from past jobs, and other plans that can be borrowed against or
withdrawn from. These definitions understate pension wealth at any point
in time and likely lead to systematic overstatements of the growth in
pension benefits over time. Over the past twenty years, the employer
pension system has moved dramatically toward defined-contribution
plans and away from defined-benefit plans. Furthermore, among defined-
contribution plans, firms have shifted from illiquid to liquid plans (as
defined by the SCF). To address these issues, we include all defined-
contribution balances, as well as estimates of defined-benefit wealth, in
the wealth definition.4
Our definition of net worth, like the measure in the SCF, does not
include expected future Social Security or Medicare benefits or taxes.
Although Social Security benefits are a significant part of wealth for
many lower- and middle-income households, their inclusion would not
alter the results. There were no new legislated changes in Social Secu-
rity over the sample period, although the retirement age did rise slightly
as legislated by the 1983 Social Security reform. If anything, Social
Security benefits increased over this time period for elderly households,
accentuating rather than offsetting the trends in private wealth. Data
from the Current Population Survey, for example, indicate that the median
annual household Social Security benefit received by a household aged
65–74 was $9,935 in 1989 (expressed in 2001 dollars) and $11,330 in
2001. This increase likely reflects higher lifetime real wages and increased
female labor force participation among the cohort aged 65–74 in 2001
compared with the cohort aged 65–74 in 1989 (as described below).
Although legislated changes to Medicare over this period affected health
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4. The appendix describes our procedures for calculating defined-benefit wealth. 
Kennickell and Sundén (1997) and Wolff (2002) have previously estimated the value of
defined-benefit wealth from SCF data. Samwick and Skinner (2004) estimate the employer-
reported values of defined-benefit pensions from the Pension Provider Surveys that accom-
panied the 1983 and 1989 SCFs.
care providers, it is not clear what net effect, if any, these changes had
on household wealth.5
The SCF also includes information on household demographic charac-
teristics, income, and current and past jobs held by the household head and
spouse. We use these data to construct a series of variables described below.
Trends in Wealth and Demographics
In this section we explore the differences in total wealth between the
1989 and 2001 samples for each of the different age groups, on average,
at the median and other selected points in the wealth distribution, and for
the entire distribution for two of the age groups. We also look at differ-
ences across the same period for the different age groups with respect to
each of several main categories of wealth. Among demographic variables,
we examine trends in marital status, longevity, health, education, and labor
force participation.
Wealth
Although the growth in equity markets and aggregate net worth over
the 1990s is well documented, the distribution of these gains across age
groups is not, and the differences in trends across age groups are striking.
Older households, defined as those headed by a person aged 55 or older,
had significantly more wealth in 2001 than did households in the same
age range in 1989, whereas younger households in 2001 generally had the
same amount of wealth as similarly aged households in 1989.6
The top panel of figure 1 shows that real median wealth for households
with a head between the ages of 65 and 74 rose by almost 60 percent, from
$169,000 in 1989 to $264,000 in 2001.7 The other two older age groups—
160 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2006
5. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) introduced new managed care options
for Medicare participants through the Medicare+Choice program and reduced the payments
to medical providers for some services. These payment cuts were partly reversed in the
Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-113)
and the Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-554).
6. Tables A-2 and A-3 in the appendix reports detailed data on wealth by age group and
year.
7. All values are deflated to 2001 dollars using the consumer price index research series
using current methods. Using the personal consumption expenditure deflator instead would
have no significant effect on the relative changes in wealth by age group.
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those aged 55–64 and 75–84—also enjoyed substantial absolute and relative
increases in wealth. In contrast, the median net worth of households with a
head between the ages of 35 and 44 actually fell from $108,000 in 1989 to
$99,000 in 2001. The other two younger age groups—those aged 25–34
and 45–54—fared similarly. The bottom panel of figure 1 shows similar
trends for mean net worth. Mean wealth for each of the older three cohorts
was roughly 50 percent higher in 2001 than for households of a similar age
in 1989. For the three younger age groups, mean wealth grew by only about
10 to 20 percent.
Figure 2 shows similar trends for the 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th per-
centiles of the wealth distribution for each age group. At each percentile the
older cohorts in 2001 had substantially more wealth than did their counter-
parts in 1989. The younger cohorts in 2001 had about the same wealth as
did their counterparts in 1989.
The top panel of figure 3 shows the entire distribution of net worth in
1989 and 2001 for households with heads aged 65–74 in those years—the
“middle” older cohort. For this group the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of net worth in 2001 lies to the right of the corresponding CDF in
1989, indicating that the 2001 sample was richer all across the distribution.
The differences are statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence level
at each decile break from the 30th to the 80th percentile.8 The bottom panel
of figure 3 shows the analogous results for households aged 35 to 44 in
1989 and 2001—the “middle” younger cohort. For these groups the distri-
bution of wealth in 1989 approximately coincides with the distribution of
wealth in 2001. No statistically significant differences occur at any decile
of these distributions.9
Data for average holdings of particular components of wealth—retirement
assets, other financial wealth, home equity, and other real assets—show
162 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2006
8. The difference between the deciles was bootstrapped with 999 replicates drawn in
accordance with the SCF sampling design. See Kennickell (2000) for information on the
construction of these replicates. Although not shown, similar statistically significant differ-
ences at the 95 percent confidence level exist for the 10th, 20th, 40th, 50th, 60th, 80th, and
90th percentiles for comparisons of the 55- to 64-year-old age groups in 1989 and 2001,
and for each decile from the 20th to the 80th percentile for comparisons of the 75- to 
84-year-old groups in the two years.
9. For the 25–34 age group, the household at the 10th percentile in 1989 has statisti-
cally significantly more wealth than the household at the 10th percentile in 2001 (not
shown). The 1989 and 2001 CDFs are statistically insignificantly different at all other
deciles for the three younger groups.
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Figure 2. Various Percentiles of Net Worth by Age Group, 1989 and 2001 (continued)
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patterns that are similar to those in the aggregate data but, not surprisingly,
somewhat noisier, given that not all households hold all types of assets:
some own their home but hold no financial wealth, for example, whereas
others have pension wealth but do not own a home, and so on. In general,
however, for each component of wealth, average holdings were higher in
2001 than in 1989 for older cohorts but not necessarily for younger cohorts.
The first panel of figure 4, for example, shows that average retirement
wealth was $79,000 higher in 2001 for the 55–64 group, $37,000 higher
for the 65–74 group, and $63,000 higher for the 75–84 group. Among the
younger groups, the 45–54 group had a mean increase of $27,000, but the
increases for the other two groups were $4,000 or less. Likewise, the aver-
age home equity of households in the 65–74 group rose from $95,000 in
1989 to $133,000 in 2001 (second panel of figure 4). In contrast, house-
holds in the 45–54 group had about the same average home equity ($104,000)
as the 65–74 group in 1989, but by 2001 the home equity of households in
this age group had not advanced beyond its 1989 level.10 Mean financial
assets rose for all age groups (third panel of figure 4). Although the
absolute difference was larger for the older groups, the proportional
increases were quite large for all groups. Other real assets, which include
equity in vehicles, investment real estate, closely held businesses, and
other miscellaneous assets, rose for the 55–64 and 65–74 groups and
were roughly flat for the younger groups and the 75–84 group (last
panel of figure 4).
Several aspects of the wealth trends noted above are significant. First,
given the well-known trend toward greater income inequality over the
sample period,11 it is worth noting that the data do not simply show that
wealthy age groups became wealthier. Median wealth for 45- to 54-year-
olds in 1989 was $193,000, for example, substantially larger than that for
households aged 65–74 ($169,000) or 75–84 ($131,000). Yet by 2001
median wealth for households aged 45–54 was virtually the same as in 1989
($191,000), whereas median wealth had risen by about $100,000 for cohorts
aged 65–74 and 75–84 relative to similarly aged counterparts in 1989
(figure 1).
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10. Although not shown in the figure, average home equity dropped for almost all age
groups in the recession of the early 1990s, but the drops were much larger, and the sub-
sequent increase in home equity was substantially more muted, for younger households
(see table A-3 in the appendix).
11. See Burtless and Jencks (2003), for example.
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Figure 4. Mean Net Worth by Asset Class and by Age Group, 1989 and 2001
(continued)
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Other wealth
Second, the results do not show that, within each age group, the rich got
richer. The differences at the 75th and the 90th percentile occur only in
the older groups, not in the younger groups (figure 3). Moreover, in the
distribution of net worth for 65- to 74-year-olds, significant differences
exist between the 1989 and 2001 distributions for the 30th to the 80th per-
centiles but not for the 90th percentile. These results are consistent with
the finding by Arthur Kennickell that although the share of wealth held by
households in the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution appears to have
increased from 1989 to 2001, the change is not statistically significant.12
Third, the results are not consistent with the view that younger house-
holds (as defined here) simply do not save very much, so that they benefited
little from the capital gains of the 1990s. In fact, median wealth for 45- to
54-year-olds in 1989 was the second highest of all groups (figure 1).
Fourth, the results show increases in all forms of wealth and increases
in overall wealth across the entire wealth distribution for older households.
This suggests that the determinants might be more than just capital gains
or the spread of 401(k) plans, because both of these are distributed quite
unequally across the wealth distribution.
Finally, it is worth noting that the facts documented here do indeed look
like trends that have occurred over time, rather than simply two isolated
sets of data points. Figure 5 shows median and mean wealth for successive
cohorts for each SCF year in the sample period: 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998,
and 2001. Because of the relatively small sample size within each age-year
cell, and because economic conditions and asset returns naturally vary over
time, the year-by-year data in these figures are necessarily noisier than the
snapshots of the 1989 and the 2001 data.
Nonetheless, the figure shows that although macroeconomic conditions
clearly affected all households, older households fared better than younger
households regardless of the state of the economy. The median net worth
of older households stayed level during the early-1990s recession and
then skyrocketed in the booming second half of the decade (first panel of
figure 5). In contrast, the median net worth of households aged 35–44 and
45–54 fell in the recession years and only came close to regaining its 1989
level in 2001 (second panel of figure 5). Likewise, older and younger
households experienced comparable drops in average wealth between 1989
William G. Gale and Karen M. Pence 169
12. Kennickell (2003). Kopczuk and Saez (2004) and Piketty and Saez (2003) present
complementary evidence that wealth inequality did not increase markedly over the 1990s.
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Figure 5. Median and Mean Net Worth by Year, for Ages 25–54 and 55–84
(continued)
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and 1992, but older households subsequently experienced much larger
wealth gains (last two panels of figure 5). By focusing on 1989 and
2001—two years that were both preceded by several strong years in the
stock and housing markets—we are able to abstract from some of this
year-to-year macroeconomic variability.
Demographics
There is a long tradition in economics, dating at least as far back as
Franco Modigliani’s work in the 1950s, relating household demographic
characteristics to wealth accumulation. Even after controlling for age,
demographic factors such as marital status, health, education, and labor force
participation can have significant effects on wealth and saving. Married
households benefit from the economies of scale and household production
associated with marriage and thus may save a larger fraction of their income
than unmarried households.13 Widowed households, in contrast, often face
a negative income shock from decreased pension and Social Security ben-
efits after a spouse’s death, as well as a wealth shock from large out-of-
pocket medical expenses incurred in the last year of the deceased spouse’s
life.14 Advances in health affect wealth indirectly by reducing the num-
ber of widowed households. In addition, workers with better health may
spend more years in the labor force and face lower out-of-pocket medical
expenses.15 Better-educated workers generally have higher lifetime earn-
ings and are more likely to be invested in the stock market.16 Education
also appears to promote better health outcomes, even after controlling for
income and wealth.17 Finally, workers who spend more years in the labor
force will have higher lifetime earnings, all else equal.
172 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2006
13. See Lupton and Smith (2003) for evidence that married households save more than
other types of households.
14. McGarry and Schoeni (2005) document that out-of-pocket medical expenses in the
last year of life are a significant factor in the poverty rate of widows.
15. Aaronson and others (this volume, table 3) document that the labor force participa-
tion rate of men and women aged 65–69 rose 4.4 and 5.8 percentage points, respectively,
from 1985 to 2000. Smith (2004) presents evidence that the out-of-pocket medical
expenses and drop in labor force participation associated with health shocks can have large
negative effects on wealth.
16. See Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) for evidence that saving increases with
education.
17. Smith (2004).
Notably, the trends in these key demographic characteristics across
cohorts in the 1990s generally mirror the patterns shown in the wealth
accumulation data. Specifically, demographic characteristics “improved”
in a number of ways for older households in 2001 relative to those in 1989,
and they either did not improve or actually deteriorated for younger house-
holds in 2001 relative to their 1989 counterparts.18 For example, the share
of married household heads rose among older households and decreased
among younger households. In 2001, 58 percent of household heads between
the ages of 65 and 74 were married, compared with 50 percent in 1989.
In contrast, among 35- to 44-year-olds, the share fell from 64 percent to
58 percent (table 1). Data from the CPS (not shown) display a similar
but more muted pattern, with the share of married households increasing
from 53 percent to 55 percent for the 65–74 age group and decreasing
from 65 percent to 61 percent for the 35–44 age group.19
The increase in the share of older married households may stem from
increases in male longevity. Since 1975, male longevity at older ages has
increased relative to female longevity, because smoking-related deaths
have increased relatively more for women and because men have benefited
disproportionately from decreases in cardiovascular disease.20 Over the
1989–2001 period, for example, male life expectancy at age 65 increased
by 12 months, whereas female life expectancy increased by only 2 months.21
Perhaps reflecting these trends, the share of SCF households headed by a
widow in the 65–74 age group fell from 31 percent in 1989 to 17 percent
in 2001.
Among younger households, the decline in the married share appears
to stem from delays in the age of first marriage. From 1989 to 2001 the
share of households aged 35–44 with a never-married head (some of whom
are living with a partner) increased from 16 percent to 22 percent. Although
the share of married 35- to 44-year-olds fell, the share living with a partner
or married held constant at 67 percent in both years.
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18. He and others (2005) provide a comprehensive overview of trends in the demo-
graphics of older households in the United States.
19. The SCF provides detailed demographic data for the head and spouse only. To
make the SCF and CPS tabulations comparable, we limit all CPS tabulations in this paper
to heads, spouses, and primary individuals.
20. Fu and others (2005).
21. Bell and Miller (2002, table 10).
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Table 1. Demographic Characteristics by Year and Age Groupa
Characteristic Change from 1989 to 2001 
and age group 1989 2001 (percentage points)
Percent married
25–34 57 47 −10***
35–44 64 58 −6**
45–54 65 58 −7**
55–64 60 61 1
65–74 50 58 8**
75–84 39 49 10**
Percent with “excellent” or “good” health
25–34 89 83 −6***
35–44 87 83 −4**
45–54 79 77 −2
55–64 62 71 9***
65–74 57 61 4
75–84 49 60 11***
Percent of men with postsecondary education
25–34 51 57 6*
35–44 60 56 −4
45–54 50 62 12***
55–64 37 54 17***
65–74 31 49 18***
75–84 24 42 18***
Percent of women with postsecondary education
25–34 43 57 14***
35–44 49 59 10***
45–54 44 57 13***
55–64 31 49 18***
65–74 27 40 13***
75–84 22 33 11***
Average full-time years in the labor force, men
25–34 10.1 9.7 −0.4
35–44 18.5 18.8 0.3
45–54 28.6 28.1 −0.5
55–64 36.9 36.3 −0.6
65–74 41.8 42.1 0.3
75–84 46.4 45.5 −0.9
Average full-time years in the labor force, women
25–34 7.0 7.3 0.3
35–44 11.3 13.8 2.5***
45–54 15.1 18.8 3.7***
55–64 17.8 22.1 4.3***
65–74 18.9 22.3 3.4***
75–84 21.7 23.9 2.2
Source: Authors’ calculations using Survey of Consumer Finances data.
a. Estimates are weighted with the SCF analysis weights. Difference in means is statistically significantly different from zero
at the *10 percent, **5 percent, or ***1 percent level. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 999 replicates in accordance with the
sample design and adjusted for imputation uncertainty.
Consistent with the increases in longevity noted above, the share of older
households who reported their health as “excellent” or “good” increased
over the 1989–2001 period (table 1). Among households in the 65–74 age
group, that share rose from 57 percent in 1989 to 61 percent in 2001.
Similarly, the share of CPS respondents aged 65–74 who described their
health as “excellent,” “very good,” or “good” increased from 67 percent
in 1995 to 70 percent in 2001 (not shown).22 These self-reported health
improvements are consistent with documented declines in chronic disabil-
ities among older households.23 The self-reported health of younger house-
holds, however, deteriorated: the share of households in the 35–44 age
group who rated their health as “good” or “excellent” fell from 87 percent
in 1989 to 83 percent in 2001. Although sampling fluctuations may account
for this drop, there is some evidence that increased rates of asthma and
diabetes have eroded the health of younger households.24
Educational attainment rose substantially for women in all age groups
between 1989 and 2001 but rose more for successive older male cohorts than
for younger male cohorts. The share of men in the 65–74 age group with
postsecondary education increased from 31 percent in 1989 to 49 percent
in 2001, whereas the share fell from 60 percent to 56 percent for men in the
35–44 age group (the other two younger age groups saw moderate increases
in the share of men with postsecondary education; table 1). For women
the corresponding increases were from 27 percent to 40 percent for the
65–74 group and from 49 percent to 59 percent for the 35–44 group. CPS
data show similar trends.25 These increases are consistent with the surge
in college matriculation rates after World War II. Although college
enrollment increased strongly throughout the twentieth century, the rise
was especially pronounced after World War II, when the share of 18- to
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22. Data from the National Health Interview Survey also show a similar increase in the
share of older households describing their health as good or better over the 1989–2001
period; compare table 21 in Lucas, Schiller, and Benson (2004) with table 70 in Adams and
Benson (1990). Costa (2002) and Cutler and Richardson (1997) explore the trends underly-
ing these improvements in health.
23. For more details see the discussion in He and others (2005, pp. 60–63).
24. Lakdawalla, Bhattacharya, and Goldman (2001).
25. The corresponding 1989–2001 changes in the CPS “percent with post-secondary
education” are as follows: men aged 65–74, from 28 percent to 44 percent; men aged
35–44, unchanged at 58 percent; women aged 65–74, from 23 percent to 35 percent;
women aged 35–44, from 49 percent to 59 percent. These CPS estimates suggest that the
SCF overstates the increase in education among older households.
24-year-olds enrolled in college rose from 10 percent in 1945 to nearly
30 percent in 1965.26 The GI Bills for World War II and Korean War vet-
erans, the democratization of the college application process, the rise in
community colleges, and the advent of birth control account for some of
this and later increases.27
Lifetime labor force participation increased for women in all age groups
over this period but stayed constant for men. For example, on average,
women in the 65–74 group had nineteen years of full-time work experience
in 1989 and twenty-two years of experience in 2001 (table 1). Men in this
age group had forty-two years of experience in both years. The forces
underlying the increase in women’s labor force participation include labor-
saving devices that made housework less burdensome, the rise of the clerical
sector, the growth of formal education, and decreased sex discrimination,
as well as increased access to birth control.28
Modeling the Effects of Demographic Changes on Wealth
We use four different methods to provide perspectives on how changes
in demographic characteristics affect the wealth accumulation of succes-
sive cohorts. The methods focus on differences in the median, mean, and
distribution of wealth.
Median
We run least absolute deviation (LAD) regressions on the pooled 1989
and 2001 data. Initially, we specify wealth for household i as a function of
just a constant and an indicator variable for being an observation in the
2001 sample:
In this specification the coefficient β1 captures the change in median
wealth between the 1989 and 2001 groups and is equal to the change in
medians shown in figure 1.
( ) .1 20011 1 1wi i i= + =( ) +α β εyear
176 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2006
26. Snyder (1993).
27. See Goldin (1999, 2006), Goldin and Katz (2002), and Stanley (2003).
28. See Bailey (2006), Costa (2000), and Goldin (2006).
In the second LAD specification, we incorporate demographic varia-
bles, denoted by X:
If demographic changes explain most of the change in wealth between
1989 and 2001, β2 should be close to zero, and the demographic variables
should enter as economically and statistically significant.29 This method
assumes that the relationship between wealth and demographic character-
istics is the same in both years (other than a shift in the intercept).
Mean
We use the familiar Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to examine how
much of the change in mean wealth for each age group comes from changes
in the demographic characteristics over time and how much comes from
all other factors, that is, from changes in the relationship between wealth
and demographic characteristics over time.30 Whereas the median regres-
sion imposes the same coefficients on the 1989 and 2001 data, this decom-
position technique allows the relationship between demographics and
wealth to differ in the two years.
Suppose that wealth w in a given year (say, 2001) is estimated as a lin-
ear combination of demographic characteristics X: w01 = X01β01 + ε01. By
the assumptions of ordinary least squares, E(w01) = E(X01β01) = E(X01)β01.
We estimate E(X01) with its sample analog X–01 and thus can express the
difference between mean wealth in 2001 and mean wealth in 1989 as
In equation 3 the term in which X is constant shows the change in wealth
attributable to changes in β, whereas the term in which β is constant shows
the change in wealth attributable to the change in X. The term in which
( )3 01 89 01 01 01 89 01 89 89E Ew w X X X X( ) − ( ) = −( ) + −β β β β
β β β β
89
01 01 89 01 89 01 89 89
( )
= −( ) + −( )X X X X .
( ) .2 20012 2 2 2w Xi i i i= + =( ) + +α β γ εyear
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29. Angrist, Chernozhukov, and Fernández-Vál (2006) show that coefficients from a
median regression, like coefficients from a mean regression, can be interpreted as partial
regression coefficients.
30. Blinder (1973); Oaxaca (1973).
β is constant will be large if changes in demographic factors explain a
substantial share of the change in wealth. Dividing each term in this equa-
tion by the change in expected wealth, E(w01) − E(w89), yields the share of
the change in wealth due to demographic characteristics versus the share
due to other factors.
Distribution
To examine the effects of demographic changes on the distribution of
wealth, we ask the following counterfactual question: what would the
distribution of wealth in 2001 look like if we took the distribution of
demographic characteristics from 2001 but applied the relationship between
demographics and wealth from 1989? Note that the latter relationship
(loosely, β89) excludes all effects of the 1990s. Thus the counterfactual
question allows us to calculate the share of the actual difference in wealth
that can be explained by differences in demographic variables alone. If the
relationship between demographics and wealth was approximately the same
in 1989 and 2001, this counterfactual distribution should look quite similar
to the actual 2001 distribution. If instead the demographics-wealth rela-
tionship was quite different in the two years, the counterfactual and the
actual 2001 distributions should diverge.
We generate the counterfactual distribution in two ways. The first is a
reweighting technique based on a paper by John DiNardo, Nicole Fortin,
and Thomas Lemieux.31 The idea is to reweight the households in the 1989
SCF so that they reflect the distribution of demographic characteristics in
the 2001 SCF. The resulting distribution of household wealth thus reflects
the 2001 demographic characteristics (due to the reweighting) and the 1989
relationship between demographics and wealth (since it still uses 1989 data).
The second approach is a resampling technique based on a paper by José
Machado and José Mata.32 Here we create a predicted wealth value for
2001 by pairing the demographic characteristics from a randomly chosen
household in the 2001 SCF with the coefficients from a quantile regression
(using a randomly chosen quantile) of wealth on demographic character-
istics from the 1989 SCF. Repeating this procedure over and over generates
a counterfactual distribution.
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31. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996).
32. Machado and Mata (2005).
More formally, we want to simulate the distribution of net worth as a
function of demographic characteristics from 2001 and of the relationship
between wealth and demographics from 1989. Borrowing notation and
exposition from DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, we write the density of
wealth at a point in time, f (w), as the integral of the density of wealth
conditional on a set of demographic characteristics X and on a date tw,
f (w⎟ X, tw), over the distribution of individual attributes F(X⎟ tx) at a date tx:
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux note that equation 4 can be rewritten as
where the weight ψx = dF(X⎟ tx = 2001)/dF(X⎟ tx = 1989).33 This term
reweights the households in the 1989 SCF so that their distribution of
demographic characteristics matches the distribution from the 2001 survey.
To estimate ψx, note that by Bayes’ law,
The first term on the right-hand side can be obtained by estimating a logit
model on the pooled 1989 and 2001 SCF data in which the dependent
variable is a dummy variable for “year = 2001” and the independent vari-
ables are demographic characteristics. (We use the sample weights in
estimating this logit.) Exponentiating the predicted value for each
observation gives the odds prob(year = 2001⎟ X)/prob(year = 1989⎟ X). We
can ignore the second term because it is constant for all observations. We
generate this weight for each household in the 1989 SCF, multiply it by
the existing sample weight for the household, and then use standard meth-
ods to estimate the weighted quantiles of the distribution.
d
d
prob yearF X t
F X t
X
x
x


=( )
=( ) =
=(2001
1989
2001 ) =( )
=( ) =
prob year
prob year prob year
1989
1989  X 2001( ) .
f w t t f w X t F X t
w x w x
; , ,= =( ) = =( )∫1989 2001 1989 ψ d x =( )1989 ,
( ) ; , ,4 1989 2001 1989f w t t f w X t F X
w x w
= =( ) = =( )∫  d tx =( )2001 .
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33. The method is conceptually similar to the standardization technique used in demog-
raphy; see Kitagawa (1964) for an early example. Barsky and others (2002) and Firpo
(forthcoming) show that this method can be used to decompose other features of the distri-
bution such as the mean and percentiles.
Whereas the DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux technique uses the actual
relationship in the 1989 data to characterize the relationship between
demographics and wealth, the Machado and Mata technique specifies this
relationship parametrically. Machado and Mata note that the conditional
distribution of wealth given demographics can be approximated at each
quantile θ in [0,1] by quantile regressions of the form w = Xβθ + ε. This
specification imposes a linear relationship between wealth and demographic
characteristics at each quantile. We estimate this specification at each
percentile from the 1st to the 99th.
To obtain the distribution of wealth that would occur with the 2001
distribution of demographic characteristics and the 1989 relationship
between wealth and demographics using the Machado and Mata tech-
nique, we employ the following procedure: In step 1 we randomly draw a
quantile θ from a uniform [0,1] distribution and obtain the corresponding
quantile regression coefficients βθ from the 1989 SCF. (We use the 1989
sampling weights when estimating these regressions.) In step 2 we ran-
domly draw an observation from the 2001 SCF and obtain its set of demo-
graphic characteristics X.34 Then we combine the coefficients βθ from
step 1 and the characteristics X from step 2 to obtain an observation from
the counterfactual wealth distribution. We repeat this procedure until a
sample of the desired size is obtained, and we estimate weighted quantiles
from this sample using the 2001 SCF sample weights.35 In both decomposi-
tions, if changes in demographic characteristics explain much of the
changes in the distribution in wealth, the counterfactual density based on
2001 demographic characteristics and the 1989 relationship between wealth
and demographics should lie near the actual 2001 wealth distribution.
Specification of Demographic Characteristics
Each of the tests above requires the specification of demographic char-
acteristics and wealth. Our specification of demographic variables balances
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34. We draw these observations using the bootstrapped replicates provided to the pub-
lic by the SCF. These replicates are drawn in accordance with the SCF sampling design.
The SCF generates a sampling weight for each of these replicates with the same algorithm
that creates weights for households on the main data set.
35. This procedure has been used by Albrecht, Björklund, and Vroman (2003) to exam-
ine the gender log wage gap in Sweden, and by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005a, 2005b)
to examine earnings inequality in the United States.
three factors. First, we allow demographic trends to affect men and women
differently. Second, our unit of observation is a household, not an individual.
Third, our sample size is relatively small (about 500 households per age
group per year), which places increased importance on having a relatively
parsimonious specification.
To characterize marital status, we define indicator variables for “married
couple or unmarried partners” (where the partners can be either of differ-
ent sexes or of the same sex), for “second or subsequent marriage,” and
for “divorced or separated.”36 Single or widowed households are the omit-
ted category. Since a divorce or death of a spouse can affect men and
women differently, we include an indicator for female-headed households
(which can include same-sex households). We also add variables for the
number of years a married household has been married and the number of
years an individual has been widowed or divorced.
We define variables for postsecondary education, years in the full-time
workforce, and fair or poor health separately for men and women.37 For a
married couple the “male” variables correspond to the characteristics of the
husband, and the “female” variables to those of the wife. For a household
with only one head, the “male” or “female” variables are used and the others
are set to zero. For a same-sex couple, the characteristics of the partner
designated as the “head” are used, and the demographic characteristics of
the other partner are ignored.
Under this specification, the effect of a marriage on wealth accumulation
is not simply measured by the coefficient βmarriage, but also varies with the
characteristics of the spouses. For example, the expected wealth of a married
couple in which both spouses have postsecondary (post-HS) education is
predicted by summing the coefficients βmarriage, βmale-post-HS, and βfemale-post-HS,
along with the appropriate male and female labor force and health co-
efficients, whereas the expected wealth of an otherwise observationally
identical married couple without postsecondary education would differ by
βmale-post-HS + βfemale-post-HS.
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36. Two unmarried individuals living together are categorized as “partners” by the SCF
if they are financially interdependent. The SCF has anywhere from zero to sixteen same-
sex couples in any ten-year age group in a given year.
37. We also explored the role of other demographic variables, including number of
children, age of the parents of the household head and spouse, number of siblings of the
household head, and whether the household head smokes, but these variables did not enter
significantly.
Wealth Transformations
To establish the robustness of our results, we use the above four tech-
niques to analyze changes in both the level and the inverse hyperbolic sine
of wealth. The level-of-wealth results explore the absolute changes in wealth
over time, whereas the inverse hyperbolic sine results explore the propor-
tionate changes in wealth over time. We use this transformation, rather than
the traditional logarithmic transformation, because it approximates the
logarithm but is defined for the zero and negative values that are common
in wealth data.
More formally, if θ is a scaling parameter and w is a measure of wealth,
the inverse hyperbolic sine of wealth can be written as θ−1sinh−1(θw) =
θ−1ln[θw + (θ2w2 + 1)1/2]. This symmetric function is linear around the ori-
gin but approximates the logarithm for larger values of wealth. To see this,
note that if w is large, ln[θw + (θ2w2 + 1)1/2] ≈ ln2θ + lnw, which is simply
a vertical displacement of the logarithm. Following previous research, we
set θ = 0.0001.38 When multiplied by this scaling parameter, coefficients
from an inverse hyperbolic sine specification, like coefficients from a
logarithmic specification, can be interpreted as the effect of a change in
a given demographic variable on the percentage change in wealth, for
wealth values that are sufficiently large.39
Results
We report results for median regressions, Blinder-Oaxaca decomposi-
tions, and decompositions of the entire net worth distribution.
Median Regressions
Table 2 reports the results of the median regressions. The first column
shows the coefficient β1 from equation 1, that is, the effect of the 2001
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38. Using maximum likelihood, Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988) find that 0.0000872
(or 0.0001, rounded) is the optimal value for the scaling parameter for net worth in their
ordinary least squares specification; Pence (2002) finds that 0.0001 is the optimal value for
her median regression specification. Kennickell and Sundén (1997) also use this parameter
value for net worth.
39. See Pence (2006) for further exposition of this result and Burbidge, Magee, and
Robb (1988) for more information on this transformation.
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indicator before adding demographic characteristics to the equation. The
values are small and imprecisely estimated for the three younger age groups,
indicating no economically or statistically significant differences in wealth
over the course of the 1990s. In contrast, the estimated coefficients are large
and significant for the three older age groups. These results, of course,
mirror the results in figure 1.
The last column of table 2 shows the coefficient β2 in equation 2, that
is, the effect of the 2001 indicator after adding all of the demographic
characteristics described above. The addition of demographic variables
removes almost all of the 1989–2001 increase in wealth for the older
cohorts. The difference in median wealth falls from $66,308 to $12,674 for
the 55–64 group, from $94,996 to −$12,919 for the 65–74 group, and from
$95,435 to $18,940 for the 75–84 group and is now statistically insignificant
in all three groups. Controlling for demographic characteristics also changes
the difference in median wealth for the younger households, but not in a
systematic or statistically significant manner. Thus the β2 coefficient in
equation 2 indicates that once one controls for demographic characteristics,
the increase in wealth observed in older cohorts disappears.
The middle four columns in table 2 show the effects of adding some but
not all of the demographic variables to the right-hand side. These speci-
fications are consistent with the demographic changes documented in
table 1: when a demographic characteristic is added to the specification,
the coefficient β2 changes the most for those age groups in which that
characteristic changed significantly from 1989 to 2001. The marital status
variables, for example, have the largest effects on the two age groups—
65–74 and 75–84—that saw large increases in the share of married house-
holds. The labor force variables affect only the 55–64 group, the group that
saw the largest increase in female labor force participation. The health and
education variables, which changed for all three older age groups, likewise
contribute to a decrease in the β2 coefficient across all three groups.
The pattern of coefficients from the inverse hyperbolic sine specification,
shown in table 3, is similar. The first column shows that, when expressed
in proportionate terms, the net worth of younger households was approxi-
mately the same in both 1989 and 2001.40 Households in the 35–44 group,
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40. To ensure that the coefficient can be interpreted as a percentage change, we use the
eβ − 1 transformation proposed by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) for indicator variables
in semilogarithmic regressions.
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for example, had 8 percent less wealth in 2001 than 1989, whereas house-
holds in the 45–54 group had 1 percent less wealth. Older households,
however, experienced substantial and statistically significant wealth gains:
the 65–74 group had 56 percent more wealth in 2001 than in 1989, and the
75–84 group had 73 percent more wealth. These results follow the figure 1
numbers when expressed in percentage terms.
As with the levels specification, older households had about the same
amount of wealth in 1989 as in 2001 once demographic variables are
included. As shown in the final column of table 3, in the full specification,
households in the 65–74 group had 4 percent less wealth in 2001 than in
1989; households in the 75–84 group had 12 percent more. These changes
are not statistically different from zero. As before, adding the marital vari-
ables has a meaningful effect only on the 65–74 and 75–84 groups, whereas
the education variables affect all three older age groups. The younger
households have a near-zero change in wealth in almost all specifications,
regardless of the control variables.
The coefficients on the demographic variables follow expected patterns
across the various specifications (table 4). Wealth increases with educational
attainment for both men and women; these coefficients are large and statis-
tically significant at the 1 percent level. Households in which either men or
women describe their health as “fair” or “poor” have lower wealth. Wealth
increases with male labor force participation but not female labor force
participation. Female labor force participation may have little effect on
wealth accumulation because, historically, lower-income women have been
more likely to work outside the home. Over the twentieth century this pattern
changed somewhat, as the stigma attached to working outside the home
decreased and the returns from market work for most women exceeded the
returns from home production. Consistent with this pattern, our regressions
indicate that female labor force participation is positively associated with
wealth accumulation for the younger groups and negatively associated with
it for the older age groups, although neither relationship is statistically
significant.41
Married couples have more wealth than widowed or single households;
divorced and separated households have about the same wealth as widowed
or single households. Wealth increases with years of marriage for the
35–44 age group, but not the 65–74 age group. Since the coefficients are
186 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2006
41. See Costa (2000) and Ramey and Francis (2006) for further discussion.
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Table 4. Median Regression Coefficients from Pooled 1989 and 2001 Dataa
Ages 35–44 Ages 65–74
Inverse Inverse 
hyperbolic hyperbolic 
Variable Levels sine Levels sine
Year = 2001 −3,773 −0.00 −12,919 −0.04 
(6,270) (0.11) (15,956) (0.11)
Male, postsecondary 78,966*** 1.03*** 349,414*** 1.23*** 
education (11,827) (0.19) (75,307) (0.30)
Female, postsecondary 71,123*** 0.97*** 231,482*** 1.00*** 
education (9,636) (0.18) (41,843) (0.24)
Male, health fair or poor −19,169** −0.43*** −79,329** −0.32*** 
(−9,508) (0.08) (34,522) (0.09)
Female, health fair or poor −27,877*** −0.54*** −97,026*** −0.51*** 
(8,596) (0.07) (16,632) (0.06)
Male, years working 3,409*** 0.05*** 3,174*** 0.01 
full-time (952) (0.01) (1,120) (0.01)
Female, years working 121 0.01* −675 −0.00 
full-time (438) (0.01) (452) (0.00)
Married or partner 29,330* 1.12** 223,869*** 1.03* 
(15,988) (0.65) (75,247) (0.76)
Second marriage −16,726 −0.06 −43,999 −0.06 
(14,766) (0.14) (48,489) (0.17)
Divorced or separated 7,314 0.57* 18,400 0.15 
(8,224) (0.41) (25,829) (0.38)
Female head only 51,012** 0.16 116,546** −0.06 
(21,027) (0.36) (55,206) (0.33)
Years married 2,134** 0.02** −1,843 0.00 
(967) (0.01) (1,573) (0.01)
Years since divorce or −839 −0.02 −1,479** −0.01* 
death of spouse (735) (0.01) (729) (0.01)
Age of household head 4,151*** 0.05*** 1,710 0.01 
(1,248) (0.02) (3,238) (0.02)
Constant −197,330*** −1.40** −89,930 2.53*** 
(51,213) (0.67) (238,988) (1.48)
Source: Authors’ regressions using Survey of Consumer Finances data.
a. Estimates are weighted. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 999 replicates in accordance with the sample design and are
adjusted for imputation uncertainty. Coefficients on indicator variables in the inverse hyperbolic sine specifications have been
transformed with eβ − 1; all coefficients in these specifications, like coefficients in a logarithmic regression, can be interpreted as
percentage changes. Statistical significance is calculated from the untransformed coefficients and standard errors. Asterisks indi-
cate statistical significance at the *10 percent, **5 percent, or ***1 percent level.
conditional on age group, the results suggest that the marginal returns to
an extra year of marriage are high for younger households but not for older
households, who may have been married for many years. The number 
of years since becoming widowed or divorced is associated with wealth
decreases for the older group but not for the younger group.
Blinder-Oaxaca Decompositions
Turning next to average net worth, we focus on the Blinder-Oaxaca
decompositions for age groups that had statistically and economically sig-
nificant increases in mean wealth. This includes the three cohorts aged
55–64, 65–74, and 75–84. The bottom three rows of each panel in table 5
show that by far the greater part of the change in the average wealth of
older households stems from demographic changes. In the levels-of-wealth
decompositions, about half of the increase in net worth for the group aged
55–64 and almost all of the increase for the groups aged 65–74 and 75–84
can be attributed to changes in demographic variables. In the inverse hyper-
bolic sine decompositions, nearly all of the net worth increase in all three age
groups can be attributed to changes in demographic variables.42 Notably,
these results are robust to whether the decomposition holds 2001 charac-
teristics and 1989 βs constant, or holds 1989 characteristics and 2001 βs
constant. In addition, at traditional significance levels, we can reject the
hypothesis that the change stemming from changes in demographic vari-
ables is zero.
Consistent with our finding that changes in demographic variables
explain most of the change in average wealth for these age groups, almost
none of the 1989 βs are statistically significantly different from the 2001
βs (not shown). Only two coefficients change in a consistent and statis-
tically significant manner across specifications and age groups: One is
the “female, postsecondary education” coefficient, which is larger in 2001
than in 1989 for the 45–54 group in both specifications, and smaller in
2001 than in 1989 for the 75–84 group in the levels specification and for
the 65–74 and 75–84 groups in the inverse hyperbolic sine specification;
the other is the “years since divorce or death of spouse” coefficient,
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42. This decomposition explains the average percentage change in wealth over the
1989–2001 period. This is not equivalent to the percentage change in average wealth that
could be calculated from figure 2.
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Table 5. Blinder-Oaxaca Decompositionsa
2001 Xs, 1989 βs 1989 Xs, 2001 βs
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
explained explained explained explained 
Age groups Total change by β by X by β by X
Levels regressions
25–34 $8,220 16 84 9 91*
(16,785)
35–44 $39,604 140** −40 85 15
(29,336)
45–54 $87,590* 86 14 48 52*
(52,569)
55–64 $312,828*** 60** 40*** 52*** 48***
(65,141)
65–74 $252,237*** −1 101*** 9 91***
(69,620)
75–84 $189,005*** 8 92*** 19 81***
(55,081)
Inverse hyperbolic sine regressions
25–34 0.4% −1,437 1,537* 474 −374
(8.3)
35–44 −2% 60 40 535* −435***
(8.3)
45–54 −2% 255 −155 1,305*** −1,205***
(10.1)
55–64 33%*** −8 108*** 18 82***
(12.9)
65–74 50.6%*** −6 106*** −4 104***
(18.3)
75–84 65%*** 21 79*** 14 86***
(23.3)
Source: Authors’ regressions using Survey of Consumer Finances data.
a. Estimates are weighted. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 999 replicates in accordance with the sample design and are
adjusted for imputation uncertainty. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the *10 percent, **5 percent, or ***1 percent
level.
which is smaller in 2001 than in 1989 in the levels specification for all
three younger age groups and in the inverse hyperbolic sine specifica-
tion for the 25–34 group.
For purposes of completeness, table 5 also reports Blinder-Oaxaca
decompositions for groups that did not have statistically significant changes
in wealth. In principle, these regressions are more difficult to interpret,
because there is no statistically significant change in wealth to explain
in the first place and because many of the changes in means are small in
economic terms as well. In practice, the results of the decomposition are
significantly less stable for the younger groups than for the older groups.
Although some of these decompositions indicate that demographic char-
acteristics explain part of the change in average wealth, our main finding
for these groups is that the results are not consistent across X and β com-
binations or across the levels and inverse hyperbolic sine specifications.
Some of the results are also not statistically significant. The jumbled and
inconsistent pattern of results that emerges for the younger groups (where
there were no significant changes in wealth) is, at the very least, quite dif-
ferent from the very clear and dominant role for demographic factors that
emerges for the older groups (where the changes in wealth are large in
economic terms and precisely estimated).
Distribution of Net Worth
The decompositions of the entire net worth distribution provide perhaps
the most powerful evidence that demographic characteristics are a signifi-
cant determinant of the greater wealth of older households in 2001. Figure 6
shows the 1989 and 2001 distributions of net worth and a counterfactual
distribution of net worth based on the 2001 characteristics and the 1989
coefficients (that is, the 1989 relationship between demographics and wealth)
for the three older age groups and for both the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux
decomposition and the Machado-Mata decomposition. For expositional
ease, net worth is shown on a logarithmic scale on the vertical axis; these
decompositions are estimated only for the inverse hyperbolic sine specifi-
cation. If the change in demographic variables explains the change in
wealth, the counterfactual and the actual 2001 distributions should largely
coincide. If instead other factors (such as historically unique capital gains)
explain the changes in wealth, the counterfactual and the actual 2001 dis-
tributions should diverge.
The figure presents the striking result that the counterfactual distribu-
tions of net worth (as defined above) nearly exactly coincide with the
actual distribution of net worth in 2001 for the 55–64 and 65–74 age
groups. This implies that almost all of the change in wealth for those
successive cohorts can be explained by changes in demographic status,
without appealing at all to any special factors in the 1990s; those special
factors would show up as changes in the relationship between demo-
graphic characteristics and wealth. Likewise, changes in demographic
characteristics can explain about half of the wealth increase for the
190 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2006
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Figure 6. Simulated Net Worth Distributions for Older Age Groups
(continued)
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Figure 6. Simulated Net Worth Distributions for Older Age Groups (continued)
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Figure 6. Simulated Net Worth Distributions for Older Age Groups (continued)
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Source: Authors’ calculations using Survey of Consumer Finances data.
a. Scaled in inverse hyperbolic sine units.
75–84 group. The deciles of the counterfactual distribution are statistically
significantly different from the deciles of the actual 1989 distribution
except at the tails.43 This result is robust to the choice of decomposition
technique, although the Machado-Mata technique appears to behave errat-
ically in the tails of the distribution.
For the younger age groups (figure 7), the 2001 distribution of net worth
is almost the same as the 1989 distribution. Thus the decomposition has
very little difference in wealth to explain, and the counterfactual distribu-
tion lies close to the actual distribution. The deciles of the counterfactual
distributions are not statistically significantly different from the 1989 dis-
tribution for any of the younger age groups.
To explore the robustness of our results for the older age groups, we
repeat the exercise but attempt to backcast 1989 wealth based on 1989
demographic characteristics and the 2001 relationship between demo-
graphics and wealth. Note that the latter relationship includes any impact
of the 1990s. If the change in demographic characteristics is a major
factor in the change in wealth, and if the relationship between demo-
graphics and wealth was the same in 1989 and in 2001, we should find
that this counterfactual 1989 distribution is similar to the actual 1989
distribution. Indeed, as shown in figure 8, for the three older age groups
this counterfactual distribution lies almost on top of the actual 1989 
distribution.
The fact that the results from both these decompositions and the earlier
Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions are robust to which year is used for the
distribution of demographic characteristics, and to which year is used for
the relationship between demographics and wealth, is notable evidence of
a robust relationship. In some empirical literatures the results are sensitive
to this choice. Barsky and his coauthors, for example, note that the role
that the black-white earnings gap plays in explaining the black-white wealth
gap appears to depend on whether the decomposition is based on the black
or the white earnings distribution.44
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43. The difference between the deciles was bootstrapped with 999 replicates drawn in
accordance with the SCF sampling design. The differences are statistically significant at a
95 percent confidence level for the 30th through the 80th percentiles for the 55–64 age
group, for the 20th through the 90th percentiles for the 65–74 age group, and for the 10th
through the 80th percentiles for the 75–84 age group. Statistical significance was estimated
only for the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux decompositions.
44. Barsky and others (2002).
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Figure 7. Simulated Net Worth Distributions for Younger Age Groupsa
(continued)
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a. All simulations use the DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux decomposition.
b. Scaled in inverse hyperbolic sine units.
Figure 7. Simulated Net Worth Distributions for Younger Age Groupsa (continued)
Figure 8. Net Worth Distributions Simulated Using the DiNardo, Fortin, 
and Lemieux Decomposition, for the Older Age Groups
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Figure 8. Net Worth Distributions Simulated Using the DiNardo, Fortin, 
and Lemieux Decomposition, for the Older Age Groups (continued)
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Source: Authors’ calculations using Survey of Consumer Finances data.
a. Scaled in inverse hyperbolic sine units.
Capital Gains, Stock Ownership Diffusion, and 401(k) Plans
The story of wealth accumulation described above is one of demographic
change. Usually, however, the 1990s are characterized in terms of large
capital gains, significant diffusion of stock ownership, and a substantial
expansion of 401(k) plans. Here we discuss the relation between these two
sets of findings.
Our results are perfectly consistent with the presence of atypically large
capital gains in the 1990s. But our results also show that, once the dust had
settled on the 1990s, the relationship between household demographic vari-
ables and household wealth had not changed relative to 1989. Had there
been large, enduring capital gains that households had saved (and not off-
set with other dissaving), the relationship between demographic variables
and wealth would have been different in 2001 relative to 1989. Thus our
results suggest either that the capital gains had dissipated by 2001,45 or that
there was nothing unusual about the level and distribution of capital gains
across households defined by demographic characteristics in the 1990s, or
that households with large capital gains had chosen to consume them by
2001.46 It would be an interesting task for future work to test among these
scenarios or other scenarios that are consistent with both the large capital
gains that appear in aggregate data and the stable relationship between
household demographic characteristics and household wealth in 1989 and
2001 that is documented above.
Similarly, our results do not deny that 401(k) participation, contribu-
tions, and assets expanded substantially during the decade. But whatever
expansion occurred did not alter the relationship between observed demo-
graphic characteristics and wealth that existed before 1990. Hence, con-
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45. The 2001 SCF was conducted from June to December 2001. By early September—
the approximate midpoint of this period—the Wilshire 5000 had fallen 28 percent from its
peak in March 2000 and had retraced all the gains accumulated since December 1998.
46. For evidence on this point, see Maki and Palumbo (2001) and Dynan and Maki
(2001), who present evidence that households with substantial capital gains in the 1990s
significantly increased their consumption. Juster and others (2006) document that house-
holds who received significant capital gains from equities decreased their saving. Poterba
(2000) provides an overview of the link between stock market wealth and consumption.
trolling for demographics, there appears to be little room for a separate
influence on wealth from this trend.47
Demographic characteristics, of course, may be related to changes in
asset markets or pension coverage. Increases in education may induce
increases in stock ownership, for example, and increases in women’s labor
force participation influence pension coverage. Nevertheless, it is unlikely
that capital gains or pensions, without reference to demographic shifts, are
the dominant explanation of how wealth changed across successive cohorts
in the 1990s, for the three reasons discussed below.
Trends in Asset Ownership and Pension Coverage across Age Groups
Unlike trends in demographic characteristics, trends in stock ownership
and pension coverage align very poorly with the changes in wealth observed
above. The share of households owning stock was 13 to 26 percentage
points higher in 2001 than in 1989 (table 6), depending on the age group. In
contrast with the demographic factors, however, stock ownership increased
the most for younger households. This is exactly the opposite of the wealth
patterns described above.
Homeownership rose by 2 percentage points for the youngest age group
and by 5 to 6 percentage points for the two oldest age groups. This pattern
is consistent with the wealth changes described above, but some of the
change in homeownership among older households may be related to the
change in demographic characteristics. For example, improved health and
a reduced probability of being widowed may have made it feasible for
more older households to remain in their homes.48
Trends in pension coverage—where coverage is defined as having a
pension from a current or past job or an Individual Retirement Account
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47. For related evidence and discussion of the effects of 401(k)s on wealth accumula-
tion, see Benjamin (2003), Bernheim (2002), Engen and Gale (2000), Engen, Gale, and
Scholz (1994, 1996), Pence (2006), and Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995, 1996).
48. Changes in financial products also made it easier for elderly households to
extract housing equity for consumption purposes without having to move, although it is
not clear that such products are very popular. Innovations in mortgage underwriting, such
as decreases in the size of down payments, may have boosted homeownership among
younger households.
200 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2006
Table 6. Asset Ownership Characteristics by Year and Age Groupa
Change from 1989 to 2001 
Characteristic and age group 1989 2001 (percentage points)
Own stock
25–34 29 55 26***
35–44 40 60 20***
45–54 44 59 15***
55–64 36 57 21***
65–74 26 40 14***
75–84 23 36 13**
Own stock through defined-contribution plan or IRA
25–34 20 46 26***
35–44 30 54 24***
45–54 33 53 20***
55–64 23 44 21***
65–74 8 24 16***
75–84 4 14 10***
Own stock through mutual fund outside of retirement account
25–34 0 12 12***
35–44 5 16 11***
45–54 7 19 12***
55–64 7 20 13***
65–74 4 17 13***
75–84 6 19 13***
Own stock directly
25–34 13 19 6***
35–44 17 22 5**
45–54 22 22 0
55–64 21 27 6*
65–74 19 20 1
75–84 18 22 4
Own house
25–34 46 48 2**
35–44 66 68 2
45–54 76 76 0
55–64 80 83 3
65–74 78 83 5*
75–84 71 77 6*
Source: Authors’ calculations using Survey of Consumer Finances data.
a. Estimates are weighted. Differences in means are statistically significantly different from zero at the *10 percent, **5 per-
cent, and ***1 percent level. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 999 replicates in accordance with the sample design and
adjusted for imputation uncertainty.
(IRA)—display patterns that are inconsistent with the wealth changes exam-
ined above (table 7). Pension coverage rose most in the youngest (25–34)
and the oldest (75–84) groups but was roughly constant in the other age
groups. The increase in coverage for the 75–84 age group may result from
the strong growth in pension coverage over the 1950s and early 1960s: the
proportion of the labor force covered by pensions rose from 22 percent in
1950 to 40 percent in 1965.49 Thus pension coverage may have been low
in the early working years for households aged 75–84 in 1989.
Pension coverage has risen especially among women, for several reasons:
their labor force participation rose, more women have earned pension
benefits based on their own work records, and more widows are receiv-
ing spousal benefits. Pension coverage among widows increased after the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 required married defined-benefit pension
beneficiaries to receive benefits in the form of a joint-and-survivor annuity
unless the spouse explicitly waived this right.50 In the SCF data the share
of women with pension benefits, either from their own work records or
from a survivor’s benefit, was 10 percentage points higher in 2001 than in
1989 for the youngest age group and was 4 to 10 percentage points higher
for the three oldest age groups.
As defined-contribution plans have become more established, the
number of years that households have participated in them has increased.
For example, the median length of participation in a defined-contribution
plan for 35- to 44-year-old men working full-time increased from four
years to six years. Nevertheless, wealth did not rise for this group, as
shown above.51
Trends in the Distribution of Wealth within Age Groups
Not only are trends in stock ownership and pension coverage not con-
sistent with trends in wealth across age groups, but at least two patterns of
wealth changes within age groups are inconsistent with a key role for stocks
or pensions. Notably, both of these anomalies are consistent with the view
that demographic characteristics were the driving force behind wealth
accumulation.
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49. Ippolito and Kolodrubetz (1986, table 28).
50. Aura (2005).
51. We exclude women from this calculation so as not to confound increases in the
length of defined-contribution participation with increases in labor force participation.
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Table 7. Pension Coverage Characteristics by Year and Age Groupa
Change from 1989 to 2001 
Characteristic and age group 1989 2001 (percentage points)
Any retirement plan coverage
25–34 52 58 6**
35–44 72 70 −2
45–54 77 76 −1
55–64 72 77 5*
65–74 66 68 2
75–84 49 62 13***
Defined-contribution or IRA coverage
25–34 39 53 14***
35–44 52 64 12***
45–54 56 65 9***
55–64 50 60 10***
65–74 30 45 15***
75–84 8 31 23***
Defined-benefit coverage
25–34 31 18 −13***
35–44 49 29 −20***
45–54 60 40 −20***
55–64 57 49 −8**
65–74 58 47 −11***
75–84 45 50 5
Both defined-contribution or IRA and defined-benefit coverage
25–34 18 14 −4**
35–44 29 22 −7***
45–54 38 30 −8***
55–64 34 31 −3
65–74 22 23 1
75–84 04 18 14***
Any retirement plan coverage, women
25–34 33 43 10***
35–44 49 51 2
45–54 58 58 0
55–64 56 60 4
65–74 42 52 10***
75–84 31 44 13***
Median years participating in a defined-contribution plan, male participants working full-time
25–34 4 3 −1
35–44 4 6 2***
45–54 6 8 2
Source: Authors’ calculations using Survey of Consumer Finances data.
a. Estimates are weighted. Differences in means are statistically significantly different from zero at the *10 percent, **5 per-
cent, or ***1 percent level. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 999 replicates in accordance with the sample design and
adjusted for imputation uncertainty.
First, changes in ownership of equities and participation in defined-
contribution plans cannot explain the growth in wealth among the sub-
stantial majority of lower-wealth older households who have neither.
For example, the entire wealth distribution shifted for older households 
(figure 3), even though fewer than a quarter of 65- to 74-year-old house-
holds in the bottom half of that age group’s wealth distribution in 2001
participated in a defined-contribution plan or IRA or held stocks in any
form. Second, since capital gains on equities accrue disproportionately
to wealthier households, who own the vast majority of stocks, the siz-
able capital gains of the 1990s should have affected the relationship
between demographics and wealth at the top of the wealth distribution.
Yet figure 3 provides no evidence of such a shift.
The Magnitude of Capital Gains
Finally, some simple calculations indicate that capital gains on pre-
existing assets cannot explain all of the observed wealth accumulation
in the 1990s. The approach we use here is fundamentally different from
the earlier calculations in the paper. Whereas the earlier calculations
looked at successive cohorts reaching the same age in different calendar
years, the calculations here track a given birth cohort over time. Never-
theless, the approach may be useful in clarifying some of the issues raised
above.
The basic calculation begins with wealth data from the 1989 SCF for
households in cohorts defined by their age in 2001. Thus, for example, for
the 45- to 54-year-old cohort in 2001, we examine data on households who
were between the ages of 33 and 42 in the 1989 SCF. We then add an esti-
mate of capital gains that accrued over the 1989–2001 period for stocks and
home values. The stock estimates are based on the Wilshire 5000 index,
and the housing estimates on the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight house price index. We exclude from the wealth measure pri-
vately held businesses and investment real estate, because it is difficult to
estimate capital gains on these assets; we exclude defined-benefit pension
wealth because, by construction, it increases until retirement and then
declines.
We also adjust for differences in mortality from 1989 to 2001 by cal-
culating a new weight for each household in the 1989 data. We obtain this
weight by multiplying the household’s sampling weight by the estimated
probability that the head, his or her spouse, or both survive until 2001.
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This estimated probability is based on data presented in a paper by Jay
Bhattacharya and Darius Lakdawalla and allows mortality to vary with the
age, sex, and education of both the head and the spouse.52 When we cal-
culate average wealth with this weight, we are putting more weight in 1989
on the more educated, wealthier households, who are more likely to have
survived until 2001. Without this adjustment we might overstate the increase
in household wealth for each cohort. The result of the capital gains and
mortality adjustments is an estimate of the 2001 wealth that the 45–54 cohort
would have been expected to have, given their 1989 wealth, trends in
mortality, and the capital gains that accrued between 1989 and 2001. Note
that this calculation assumes that the cohort does no active saving from
1989 to 2001. We then compare this value with the actual wealth of the
cohort in the 2001 SCF, after subtracting any bequests that members of the
cohort reported receiving between 1989 and 2001 (as well as excluding
the value of any privately held businesses, investment real estate, and
defined-benefit pension wealth, as mentioned above). This allows us to
measure how much of the change in the cohort’s wealth between 1989 and
2001 can be explained by accruing capital gains on the 1989 wealth stock
(adjusted for differences in mortality within the cohort).
These calculations, reported in table 8, show that, for the cohort aged
35–44 in 2001, only about 13 percent of the change in average wealth
between 1989 and 2001 (adjusted for mortality and bequests) can be
explained by capital gains on the 1989 wealth stock. This figure is so low
because this cohort did not own much in the way of stocks or housing when it
was aged 23–32, and because much of the wealth gain occurred mechani-
cally, as a result of single households getting married and pooling their assets.
As we move through the subsequent age cohorts, a pattern emerges: the
share of the change in wealth explained by capital gains on the 1989 wealth
stock increases with cohort age. This share is about a fifth of the change in
wealth (18 percent) for the cohort aged 45–54 in 2001, about a third of the
change in wealth (32 percent) for the cohort aged 55–64, and about half
(58 percent) for the cohort aged 65–74. For the oldest group—those aged
75–84—the change in wealth is more than explained (111 percent) by cap-
ital gains. These results are consistent with the notion that active saving
is concentrated among younger households. It is interesting that these
204 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2006
52. Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla (2006). We are grateful to these authors for provid-
ing us with their data.
younger households had no wealth increase relative to earlier generations,
given how much active saving they apparently did. Of course, the rele-
vant comparison is how much active saving they did relative to the active
saving of earlier cohorts.
These figures are consistent with the view that capital gains were large
during the 1990s, but they also suggest that capital gains alone do not come
close to explaining overall wealth accumulation for the cohorts who were
plausibly in the accumulation stage of the life cycle. This, however, only
adds to the puzzle presented above, since it suggests that there must have
been significant active saving, whereas other studies have shown that active
saving rates in the 1990s were lower than in previous decades.53
Conclusion
We have documented that the remarkable wealth accumulation that
occurred in the 1990s accrued overwhelmingly to older households and
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Table 8. Calculating Capital Gains as a Share of Overall Wealth Change 
from 1989 to 2001
Thousands of 2001 dollars
Age in 2001 (years)
Average net wortha 35–44 45–54 55–64 65–74 75–84
(1) In 1989 44 114 214 260 279
(2) In 1989 with imputed 60 151 297 353 374
1989–2001 capital gains
(3) In 1989 with imputed 60 153 301 365 414
capital gains and 
differential mortality
(4) In 2001 176 350 514 461 413
(5) Bequests received 11 18 26 21 12
since 1989
(6) In 2001 excluding bequests 165 332 488 440 401
received since 1989
Percent of wealth change 13 18 32 58 111
explained by capital gains 
[(3)−(1)]/[(6)−(1)]
Source. Authors’ calculations using Survey of Consumer Finances data.
a. Excluding defined-benefit wealth, privately held businesses, and investment real estate.
that these gains accrued across the entire wealth distribution for older
households. Younger households in 2001 generally had not accumulated
more wealth than similarly aged households in 1989. The observed trends
are not simply a reflection of the rich getting richer or of the (mistaken)
notion that younger households, as defined here, do not accumulate any
wealth under any circumstances. Rather, the trends reflect broad-based
changes in demographics across birth cohorts and the role of demographic
factors in influencing wealth accumulation. Although there were clearly
large changes in capital gains, diffusion of stock ownership, and expansion
of 401(k) plans, those changes do not appear to have altered the observed
relationship between demographic factors and wealth in 2001 from what
it had been in 1989. Developing hypotheses that are consistent with both
these macro trends for stocks and pensions and the micro evidence pre-
sented here on the relationship between demographics and wealth is an
important direction for future research.
Although our results establish a strong reduced-form link between
household demographic characteristics and wealth outcomes, we have not
investigated the channels through which this link occurs. Demographic
factors such as education clearly raise lifetime earnings.54 As discussed
earlier, the same factors could also raise saving rates and could affect
portfolio choices and hence the return to saving. Understanding the rela-
tive importance of each of these channels remains another important issue
for future research.
Other research using successive cross sections has yielded mixed results.
Edward Wolff uses a similar approach to ours, looking at successive cross
sections, but reaches a different conclusion about basic trends in wealth
for older households.55 He estimates declines in wealth for the age group
aged 47–64 in 1998 compared with a similar age group in 1983. The dif-
ference in results may be due to the emphasis on different age groups, time
periods, data adjustments, or econometric techniques.56 Another possible
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56. For example, Wolff uses a different method to estimate Social Security wealth in
1983 than in subsequent years. The ensuing change in this wealth partly drives his conclu-
sion. In addition, he scales up the reported wealth variables in the SCF to match aggregate
data from the Flow of Funds Accounts, a procedure that raises some issues: there are many
different ways to adjust the data to match the aggregates, and the differences between the
raw trends and the adjusted wealth trends are substantial and sometimes even have dif-
ferent signs. Weicher (1999), Kennickell (1999), and Juster, Smith, and Stafford (1999)
factor is that the SCF shows a larger increase in aggregate wealth than
do the Flow of Funds Accounts over the 1998–2001 period.57 We have
not resolved this discrepancy but believe it is of less importance for our
analysis, which examines household-specific wealth and controls for demo-
graphic factors, than for measures of trends in aggregate wealth. For exam-
ple, if the estimate of wealth from the SCF data differs from that from the
Flow of Funds because the SCF over- or undersampled particular demo-
graphic groups, our regressions and analysis would in essence control for
that concern by controlling for demographic factors.
Steven Venti and David Wise also follow successive cohorts and doc-
ument a central fact similar to our main result, namely, that more-recent
retirees have more wealth than earlier retirees;58 however, they focus on a
different time period (1984–91) and attribute the results to a different cause
(the growth of retirement plans). Eric Engen, Gale, and John Karl Scholz
provide alternative interpretations of the Venti and Wise results.59
Our results also relate to the literature on the adequacy of households’
saving for retirement.60 In particular, the finding of higher wealth among
more-recent older working cohorts and retirees than among previous older
working cohorts and retirees does not necessarily imply that more-recent
retirees and older workers have greater ability to maintain their living stan-
dards in retirement. The same demographic factors that appear to have
fueled the increase in wealth also are likely to raise the expenditures needed
to maintain living standards in retirement. Married couples consume more
than single households. Highly educated households likely enjoyed higher
consumption during their working years and may want to sustain that con-
sumption in retirement. Healthier people will live longer and hence have
a longer period of retirement to finances, at any given retirement age.
Thus welfare assessments of higher wealth levels need to be made care-
fully, and some simple measures, such as wealth-to-earnings ratios for
households at a given age, may prove misleading over time.
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discuss some similar issues with Wolff (1998), who responds to these criticisms in Wolff
(1999). Wolff’s most recent work (Wolff, forthcoming) does not make these adjustments.
57. See Bosworth and Bell (2005, table 2) for more details.
58. Venti and Wise (1996).
59. Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996).
60. See Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) and Congressional Budget Office (2003) for a
review of the literature, and Hurst (2003), Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (forthcom-
ing), and Engen, Gale, and Uccello (2005a, 2005b) for more recent work.
The analysis may be particularly unfavorable for the prospects of the
baby-boom generation, whose members were between the ages of 37 and
55 in 2001. These households have less favorable demographic charac-
teristics than similarly aged households in 1989, and, despite having
lived through the bull market decade of the 1990s, they had no more
wealth, on average, than their 1989 counterparts. This conclusion is
consistent with the finding of Barbara Butrica and Cori Uccello that the
“late boomers” (those born during 1956–64) are likely to have less
wealth at retirement than their “early boomer” predecessors (those born
during 1946–55), in part because of unfavorable demographic charac-
teristics.61 Furthermore, households from the baby-boom and later gen-
erations seem unlikely to make up any wealth shortfall through
inheritances from earlier generations. In all three of the younger SCF
age groups, the share expecting to receive a bequest was lower in 2001
than in 1989. For example, 14 percent of households aged 45–54 in
2001 expected to receive a substantial inheritance in the future, com-
pared with 20 percent in 1989.62
Looking forward, there are serious questions about how the matura-
tion of the baby-boomers into old age and the aging of society in general
will affect financial markets. Previous literature examining this issue
has focused on the role of cohort size, with generally mixed results.63
Our results suggest that the demographic characteristics of retiring gen-
erations, rather than just cohort size, may matter significantly for wealth
accumulation and financial behavior. Thus trends in education, health,
family composition, retirement age, and so on could well have first-
order effects on the wealth accumulation and financial status of today’s
young generations and future generations.
More generally, and perhaps most important, our findings highlight the
role of demographic factors in wealth accumulation. With skyrocketing
equity markets in the 1990s, it was natural to focus on how financial mar-
kets affect wealth. Our results serve to highlight a long, but sometimes
downplayed, tradition in economics—dating back at least to the original
formulation of the life-cycle model by Modigliani and coauthors—
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61. Butrica and Uccello (2004).
62. See also Hurd and Smith (2002).
63. See Bakshi and Chen (1994), Brooks (2003), Geanakoplos, Magill, and Quinzii
(2004), and Poterba (2001).
that emphasizes the role of demographic variables in wealth accumula-
tion.64 In recent years many government initiatives have attempted to boost
wealth by providing direct incentives for asset purchases. An implication
of our results is that policies that raise investment in health, education, and
other forms of human capital could have far-reaching consequences for
saving and wealth accumulation.
A P P E N D I X
Valuing Pension Wealth
THE SCF ASKS each spouse in each surveyed household to report informa-
tion on up to three pension plans from his or her current job. In addition,
the household may report information on up to six plans from previous jobs
of either spouse and up to six plans from which either spouse is currently
receiving benefits. Estimating the value of defined-contribution pension
plans and IRAs is straightforward: we simply sum the reported account
balances for all such plans.
For defined-benefit pensions, the SCF asks households when they expect
to start receiving benefits and what they expect their monthly benefits to be.
Households may report benefits as a percentage of pay at retirement or as
a monthly dollar amount. We estimate the expected present value of this
stream of payments using year-specific life tables from the National Center
for Health Statistics.65 To ensure that changes in pension wealth over time
are not driven by temporary changes in interest rates and inflation, we use
nominal discount rates of 6 percent and inflation rates of 3 percent in all
years in computing these present values. For households that report bene-
fits as a percentage of pay at retirement, we assume 1 percent annual real
wage growth from the year of the survey until the worker’s expected year
of retirement.
Comparing the current value of defined-contribution accounts with
the expected present value of future defined-benefit payments is prob-
lematic, however, because defined-contribution account balances reflect
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(1993), Browning and Crossley (2001), Browning and Ejrnaes (2002), Goldin (2006),
Rosen and Wu (2003), Smith (1995, 2001, 2004), and Smith and Ward (1980).
65. Available at www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/pubs/pubd/lftbls/lftbls.htm.
only wealth accumulation to date whereas defined-benefit wealth reflects
wealth accumulated over a worker’s entire past and future career. As a
result, if a defined-benefit plan and a defined-contribution plan pay identical
benefits in each year of retirement for a worker with a given set of charac-
teristics, the reported value of the defined-contribution plan will be lower
than the reported value of the defined-benefit plan, using the standard
methods above, at every age except retirement, when they would be equal.66
We experiment with two methods for putting defined-contribution
and defined-benefit wealth on the same basis. First, we transform defined-
benefit wealth to defined-benefit wealth accrued to date. Let g be real growth
in wages, T the number of years that the worker has been on the job, N the
number of years until the worker leaves the job, w the worker’s annual wage,
and a the accrual rate. Assume that pension benefits are based on a maxi-
mum of thirty years of earnings. Then the benefit earned by the worker to
date is
and the benefit earned by the worker over his or her entire career is
To transform defined-benefit wealth into defined-benefit wealth accrued to
date, we multiply defined-benefit wealth by the ratio of the values from
equations A-1 and A-2:67
In computing this ratio we use the self-reported year in which the worker
expects to leave his or her job.
Second, we transform defined-contribution wealth to wealth accumu-
lated over the worker’s career by adding the expected present value of
future employee and employer contributions. The SCF asks households
the percentage of pay that the employee and the employer contribute to
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66. See Gale (1998) for further discussion.
67. We thank Paul Smith for suggesting this approach.
the account, and when the workers in the household expect to leave their
current jobs. We assume, as before, 1 percent real wage growth and assume
that workers and employers hold constant the percentage that they contribute
to the plan until the worker’s expected year of leaving the job. Like the first
method, this one has the advantage of putting defined-benefit and
defined-contribution wealth on a similar basis. However, because this
method puts defined-benefit and defined-contribution wealth on a different
basis than all other forms of wealth, we emphasize the first method in our
empirical work. We have verified, however, that our results are robust to
using the second method.68
One limitation of these data, obviously, is that they are self-reported.
As several studies have documented, workers are often not well informed
about their pension benefits.69 As a rough check on our results, we compare
the mean and median of our defined-benefit wealth measure with the equiv-
alent mean and median from the Health and Retirement Study extract
constructed by Scholz, Ananth Seshadri, and Surachai Khitatrakun.70 The
latter measures are based on employer-reported data when available and
worker-reported data otherwise. Both samples are limited to households
whose head was between the ages of 51 and 61 in 1992; defined-benefit
wealth is expressed in 1992 dollars. The means and medians of the two data
sets are fairly close in magnitude, despite the differences in data sources
and estimation procedures (table A-1). A possible additional refinement,
which we do not pursue in this paper, is to adjust the pension benefits for
taxes as described in Poterba (2004).
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68. Khitatrakun, Kitamura, and Scholz (2001) use this method to put defined-benefit
and defined-contribution wealth on the same basis.
69. Mitchell (1988), Gustman and Steinmeier (1989, 2004), and Starr-McCluer and
Sundén (1999) compare employer and employee reports of pension benefits and conclude
that some workers are poorly informed about their pension benefits.
70. As reported in table 1 of Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (forthcoming).
Table A-1. Comparison of SCF and HRS Defined-Benefit Wealth
1992 dollars
Defined-benefit wealth
Data set (1992) Mean Median
Survey of Consumer Finances 95,808 14,785
Health and Retirement Study 106,041 17,327
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances and Scholz and others (forthcoming).
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Table A-2. Net Worth by Year and Age Group
Thousands of 2001 dollars
Measure and age group 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
Net worth, median
25–34 21 26 29 23 24
35–44 108 79 81 91 99
45–54 193 150 169 169 191
55–64 212 228 234 233 278
65–74 169 178 193 252 264
75–84 131 142 130 185 226
Net worth, mean
25–34 96 80 73 99 105
35–44 244 195 194 240 284
45–54 485 412 441 462 573
55–64 533 554 578 692 846
65–74 510 433 499 609 763
75–84 362 318 340 418 551
Net worth, 10th percentile
25–34 0 −1 0 −6 −2
35–44 0 1 1 1 1
45–54 7 5 7 4 4
55–64 1 9 10 16 13
65–74 7 7 9 14 19
75–84 5 7 19 11 12
Net worth, 25th percentile
25–34 2 3 5 1 3
35–44 23 17 18 18 21
45–54 51 43 56 53 44
55–64 65 83 73 76 77
65–74 61 58 62 87 87
75–84 33 49 58 67 69
Net worth, 75th percentile
25–34 98 90 83 77 93
35–44 263 191 188 232 267
45–54 483 410 430 456 497
55–64 521 536 587 502 663
65–74 405 385 447 538 709
75–84 294 330 323 411 500
Net worth, 90th percentile
25–34 233 189 165 179 231
35–44 500 388 404 481 554
45–54 1,021 853 892 802 1,128
55–64 1,170 1,173 1,099 1,203 1,553
65–74 1,042 885 949 1,138 1,351
75–84 632 673 656 805 1,029
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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Table A-3. Measures of Components of Wealth by Year and Age Group
Thousands of 2001 dollars
Measure and age groupa 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
Retirement wealth
25–34 19 21 24 24 18
35–44 60 47 51 61 64
45–54 134 124 152 126 161
55–64 149 181 192 204 228
65–74 128 100 131 155 165
75–84 33 53 56 81 96
Housing wealth
25–34 22 19 13 19 23
35–44 61 44 42 43 62
45–54 104 77 70 72 95
55–64 106 92 90 101 127
65–74 95 92 88 108 133
75–84 86 86 86 102 126
Net financial assets
25–34 17 10 12 22 29
35–44 36 31 33 59 59
45–54 74 65 82 104 147
55–64 98 113 118 182 240
65–74 133 105 143 204 231
75–84 157 116 130 148 237
Other real assets
25–34 38 29 24 34 35
35–44 87 74 69 77 99
45–54 173 146 136 160 170
55–64 179 168 178 206 251
65–74 155 136 137 143 234
75–84 86 63 68 87 92
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
a. All estimates are means.
Comments and 
Discussion
Alan S. Blinder: With one exception, which I will come to later, this paper
is very readable, fact-based, and enlightening. It reminds me of one of those
famous Yogi Berra quotations: “You can observe a lot just by watching.”
William Gale and Karen Pence watch the data on household wealth accu-
mulation from 1989 to 2001 and observe two interesting phenomena that
others have missed:
—The change in household wealth over this period was concentrated in
the upper age groups, such as those 55 and older. The authors’ figures 1
and 2 show this clearly and, by the way, indicate that the mean and the
median exhibit the same basic pattern.
—These older groups did better because they “improved” their demo-
graphics, not because, for example, they held most of the stock as the
S&P 500 climbed about 270 percent over those twelve years.
Each of these observations is stated clearly and backed up by impressive
data crunching. And, as the authors point out, the two findings are not just
corollaries of the well-known fact that wealth has become increasingly
concentrated. Something else was going on.
As I read the paper for the first time, I wondered why the editors asked
me to be a discussant. Then I came to the first mention of the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition, and it was “déjà vu all over again.” Since macro-
economics-oriented readers may be unfamiliar with the Blinder-Oaxaca
technique, let me just say that it is a simple, regression-based decomposi-
tion of the mean difference in the attainment of some left-hand-side vari-
able (wages in my original application, wealth in this case) between two
populations (blacks and whites in my original application, wealth holders
in 1989 and 2001 in this case) into a portion attributable to differences in
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the right-hand-side variables and a portion attributable to differences in the
coefficients. So its use here, although probably unprecedented in the Brook-
ings Papers, is appropriate.
Specifically, assume linear regressions explaining the wealth of individ-
ual i in year t, where t = 1989 or 2001:
The notation indicates that both the attributes X of individuals (such as
health or marital status) and the regression coefficients β on those attri-
butes may change over time. The question is: How much of the change in
mean wealth of one group versus another can be attributed to changes in X
and how much to changes in β? In this case the changes in X indicate how
much individual i “improved” herself (changing her attributes so as to gen-
erate more wealth), and the changes in β indicate how much the economy
changed its valuations of those attributes (how much more or less wealth
those attributes typically generated).
Conceptually, think of the “time derivative” of equation 1 as being ΔW =
βΔX + XΔβ. There are two discrete-time decompositions:
In each decomposition the first term measures the portion attributable to
changes in average characteristics between 1989 and 2001 (the major ones
for Gale and Pence being education, health, and marital status), evaluated
at one of the two “price vectors.” The second term measures the portion
attributable to changes in coefficients between 1989 and 2001, evaluated at
one of the two “quantity vectors.” Note that neither decomposition has any
inherent claim to superiority. So, unless they lead to approximately the
same conclusions, the evidence must be scored as inconclusive—analogous
to when a Laspeyres index and a Paasche index give sharply different mea-
sures of inflation.
With this in mind, turn now to the upper panel of Gale and Pence’s
table 5, where the results from both versions of their Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition are displayed. The two versions of equation 2 agree quite
well for four of the six age groups. In three of those cases (ages 25–34,
65–74, and 75–84), the story is that virtually all the action stems from
changes in demographics—the second of Gale and Pence’s findings above.
( )2 01 89 01 89 89 01b E W E W E X E X E X( ) − ( ) = ( ) − ( )[ ] + ( )β β β01 89−[ ].
( )2 01 89 01 89 01 89a E W E W E X E X E X( ) − ( ) = ( ) − ( )[ ] + ( )β β β01 89−[ ]
W Xit it t it= +β ε .
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The two decompositions also agree for the 55- to 64-year-olds, but here the
split is closer to 50–50 between changes in β and changes in X. It is the
cases of the 35- to 44-year-olds and the 45- to 54-year-olds that are trou-
bling, because here the two decompositions disagree notably. The decom-
position for the 45- to 54-year-olds even “flips” qualitatively, from 86–14
in favor of Δβ to 48–52 in favor of ΔX. Thus Gale and Pence’s second find-
ing is not quite as robust as they suggest—although, as they note, it works
best where most of the money is found, that is, with the oldest age groups.
Things get murkier with Gale and Pence’s other methodological innova-
tion: the use of the inverse hyperbolic sine function, for what I assume is the
first time in Brookings Papers history. In the first place, the method itself is
hard to decipher. Being a member of the cohort aged 55–64 in 2001, I had
to scurry to an ancient reference book from high school—the famous CRC
Standard Mathematical Tables—to relearn something I may have known
then: that the inverse hyperbolic sine function looks like this:
The reader might or might not have figured this out after being told that
the function is
where w is wealth and θ is a parameter. This function starts to track
ln(2θw) closely once θw exceeds 3. For example, for θw = 1, sinh−1(1) =
sinh ln ,− ( ) = + +( )⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥1 2 2
1
21θ θ θw w w
0.88 and ln(2) = 0.69, which is still a considerable distance apart. But for
θw = 3, sinh−1(3) = 1.82 and ln(6) = 1.79, which is getting close.
Forgetting trigonometry is one thing, but the Blinder-Oaxaca decom-
positions shown in the bottom panel of table 5 left me even more baffled.
Are we really to believe, for example, that the decomposition for 45- to
54-year-olds attributes 1,305 percent of the change in wealth to changes in
coefficients and −1,205 percent to changes in characteristics? I know this
is possible mathematically, but it strains credulity. Notice that in the upper
panel of that same table, which uses the more conventional specification
based on levels, the corresponding figures are 48 percent and 52 percent.
This leaves me confused and wondering whether the problem lies in the
sinh−1(.) approximation. I must admit that I prefer the more familiar linear
specification that Yogi would have called “déjà vu all over again.”
Let me return to Gale and Pence’s first finding, that most of the accre-
tions to wealth over 1989–2001 went to older people. The first column of
table 1 above, which I have calculated from their appendix table A-2, sum-
marizes this finding. It shows that the median wealth of the three youngest
age groups advanced little, if at all, over the twelve-year period, while that
of the older age groups soared. (See also the authors’ figure 5.) Yet the
story is not quite that clear. The next two columns break the sample period
in half, showing that from 1989 to 1995 the largest percentage gains by far
accrued to 25- to 34-year-olds (although from a small base), while 75- to
84-year-olds gained nothing. From 1995 to 2001 these roles were reversed:
the young lost ground while the oldest got rich. But neither column sug-
gests a particularly sharp divide between the three youngest age groups and
the three oldest in either subperiod. Did the demographic forces change dra-
matically around 1995? More likely, the juxtaposition of the two columns
suggests the importance of calendar time per se. And one reason may be
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Table 1. Changes in Real Median Net Worth by Age Group
Percent
Age group 1989–2001 1989–95 1995–2001
25–34 +14 +38 −17
35–44 −10 −26 +22
45–54 −1 −11 +12
55–64 +30 +10 +18
65–74 +56 +14 +37
75–84 +73 −1 +74
Source: Author’s computations from data in Gale and Pence, this volume, appendix table A-2.
that the S&P stock index rose 68 percent from 1989 to 1995 but 120 per-
cent from 1995 to 2001.
To pursue the role of calendar time further, one can use the Gale-Pence
numbers in their table A-2 to follow the same birth cohorts through time—
or, rather, one can almost do so. For example, and here I will switch from
medians to means, people aged 25–34 in 1989 had mean wealth of $96,000.
Nine years later these same people were 34–43 years old, and the table tells
us that 35- to 44-year-olds had mean wealth of $240,000 in 1998. So,
ignoring the one-year age discrepancy, one can estimate that these people
increased their wealth by ($240,000 − $96,000)/$96,000, or 150 percent.
Now consider people just three years younger, who were aged 25–34 
in 1992 and aged 34–43 (which I treat as the same as 35–44) in 2001.
Their approximate increase in wealth was ($284,000 − $80,000)/$80,000 =
255 percent, which is vastly more. This is not an isolated, atypical example.
Table 2 above presents parallel calculations for all the birth cohorts that can
be analyzed in this way. In every case the cohort three years younger—and
thus experiencing the years 1998–2001 instead of 1989–1992—did far better.
My rhetorical question is this: Is it plausible to believe that such a huge
difference in wealth accumulation could have been due to dramatically dif-
ferent demographic changes between cohorts born just three years apart?
And my suggested answer is no. I further suggest that calendar time—
in particular, removing 1989–92 and adding 1998–2001 to the nine-year
period of wealth accumulation—probably contributes more to the expla-
nation. The years 1998–2001 were simply a much better time for wealth
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Table 2. Real Mean Wealth Increases of Cohorts Three Years Apart
Birth years Decade over which Increase in mean 
increase is measureda wealth (percent)
1955–64 1989–98 150
1958–67 1992–2001 255
1945–54 1989–98 89
1948–57 1992–2001 194
1935–44 1989–98 43
1938–47 1992–2001 105
1925–34 1989–98 14
1928–37 1992–2001 38
1915–24 1989–98 −18
1918–27 1992–2001 27
Source: Author’s computations from data in Gale and Pence, this volume, appendix table A-2.
a. Cohorts are chosen such that the first in each pair was the same age in 1989–98 as the second was in 1992–2001.
accumulation by American households than 1989–92. Nor is this a secret
or some kind of new discovery. According to data from the Survey of Con-
sumer Finances, mean family net worth rose by 28.7 percent between the
1998 and 2001 surveys but fell by 10.2 percent between the 1989 and 1992
surveys.1
What about Gale and Pence’s second main finding, that the way to accu-
mulate wealth is to be married, healthy, and educated beyond high school?
In general, this sounds like good advice for economic success in any dimen-
sion. For example, everyone knows that being married, healthy, and better
educated leads to higher wages. What is striking is how strong their evi-
dence is—maybe too strong, as I will explain in a moment.
Gale and Pence’s tables 2 and 3 and the accompanying figures make a
rather convincing case that demographic improvements in the older age
groups and demographic deteriorations in the younger age groups go a long
way toward explaining their disparate performances in wealth accumula-
tion over the twelve years. It was surprising, to me at least, to find such
sharp differences in demographic “performance” in their table 1. I was not
surprised that fewer “young” people (ages 25–54) were married in 2001
than in 1989, but I was surprised to learn that more old people (ages 65–84)
were. Similarly, although everyone knows that older people (ages 55–84)
were healthier in 2001 than in 1989, I did not realize (and in fact am not
sure) that younger people (ages 25–54) became less healthy. But the biggest
surprise for me was that the gains in postsecondary education for men were
concentrated in the older age groups (ages 45–84), not the younger ones. For
example, 18 percent more 75- to 84-year-olds had postsecondary education
in 2001 than in 1989, whereas the corresponding gain for 25- to 34-year-olds
was only 6 percent.
That said, I would not dismiss the relevance of calendar time quite as
readily as Gale and Pence do. As I mentioned above, Americans accumu-
lated a lot more wealth during 1998–2001 than during 1989–92. It is prob-
ably no coincidence that 1998–2001 were boom years whereas 1989–92
included a recession and a sluggish recovery therefrom.
Remember also that wealth accumulation derives from only two sources:
net private saving and the returns on wealth, including (prominently) asset
revaluations. Now think back to the demographic differences that Gale and
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1. For 1998–2001 see Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003, p. 7). For 1989–92 see
Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Surette (2000, p. 7).
Pence emphasize. I am quite prepared to believe that being married, healthy,
and educated all contribute to higher productivity, and therefore to higher
real wages and more saving. But net private saving in the National Income
and Product Accounts over 1990–2000 came to only about $5 trillion,
whereas Gale and Pence state that aggregate net worth rose by about $22 tril-
lion (more than doubling) over the decade. Could it be that being married,
healthy, and more educated also contribute to wiser portfolio choices that
produce better asset returns? That is an intriguing thought that Gale and
Pence’s results raise. But the fact that the preponderance of wealth accumu-
lation comes from asset returns does bring me back to the relevance of cal-
endar time per se. With stock prices and home prices soaring, 1989–2001
was a good time to accumulate wealth without the nuisance of saving. Surely
that played an important role in the wealth accumulation of every age group,
a role separate and distinct from demographic change.
So I do not think the authors’ findings on demographic change, interest-
ing as they are, should lead us to dismiss calendar time. Since we have two
eyes and two ears, we can entertain two hypotheses at once. Which, of
course, reminds me of one final Yogi aphorism: “When you come to a fork
in the road, take it.”
John Sabelhaus:1 This paper by William Gale and Karen Pence establishes
a new set of empirical regularities about wealth accumulation and demo-
graphics that will ultimately prove to be very important for the literature on
life-cycle saving behavior. The authors show that between 1989 and 2001
several measures of wealth rose significantly for households where the
head was of retirement age or older, but that those same measures were
unchanged for younger households. The authors argue that these divergent
patterns are explained by demographic variables, on the following logic: if
one starts with the observed variation in wealth holdings between demo-
graphic groups at either point in time the change in the wealth distribution
is perfectly explained by the shifts in population across those demographic
groups over time. The authors also argue that these relative shifts are not
explainable by the extraordinary capital gains that occurred in the 1990s,
which they take as further evidence of the importance of demographic
changes.
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1. The analysis and conclusions expressed in these comments are those of the author
and should not be interpreted as those of the Congressional Budget Office.
The first question to ask of a paper like this is whether the newly found
empirical regularity is somehow incomplete or misleading. The answer in
this case is almost certainly no; the results appear robust. The only issue I
will raise concerns how the wealth measures within groups are tabulated
in each year. The authors tabulate the data by households, rather than by
persons within households, and this approach to measurement could be
affecting (in particular) their conclusions about the effect of marriage on
wealth accumulation.
The more interesting issue to explore is what the findings suggest for
models of life-cycle saving behavior. The main issue I will address is
whether the demographic variables are really explanatory in and of them-
selves; an alternative interpretation is that the demographic variables the
authors consider are simply highly correlated with lifetime income. This
matters because the richness of life-cycle models is still greatly hampered
by computational constraints; parsimony in the state space is still neces-
sary. Can the demographic variables identified by the authors be mapped
back onto the traditional state variables, or must the life-cycle models be
expanded to accommodate these new findings?
Finally, the authors weigh in on the issue of how ultimate patterns of
wealth accumulation are affected by asset revaluations over time. Their
goal is to show that the extraordinary capital gains of the 1990s are not
driving the relationship between demographics and wealth accumulation. I
argue that more work is needed before one can claim to have learned any-
thing really new about the role of capital gains in wealth accumulation.
The 1989–2001 period is not as extraordinary as one might think, and it is
not clear that the effect of gains is even being measured against any rele-
vant benchmark.
Measuring wealth distributions across groups and time. The evidence
presented by the authors about shifting wealth distributions is compelling
and significant and appears robust. They show clearly that the entire distri-
bution of household-level wealth shifted outward for older households but
did not change for younger households. The inferences later in the paper
about the effect of demographics on wealth all come back to this basic find-
ing, and so it is important to consider how the decisions made when con-
structing the wealth distributions might be affecting the conclusions.
Although the analysis requires many assumptions about what wealth con-
cept to use, how to construct various components, and what statistics to
consider, the authors have done a convincing job of sensitivity analysis with
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respect to each of these, and so I have no doubt that their conclusions
would hold up under close scrutiny. The only consideration I think is
worth mentioning—and mostly because it bears on my comments about
the implications of these findings for the life-cycle model—is whether
wealth should be tabulated by households or by persons. I do not doubt
that the effective decisionmaking unit for studying wealth is the house-
hold. My concern is about separating the effect of marriage from the effect
of lifetime earnings.
The issue is this: if marriage patterns change across cohorts, one should
observe changes in household-level wealth distributions at a given age
even if lifetime earnings and life-cycle wealth accumulation behavior did
not change. Consider two single people between the ages of 35 and 44,
each with $20,000 in wealth in the 2001 sample. Then consider the same
two people in 1989, but married and holding $40,000 in wealth. Although
the per-person wealth levels are equivalent, this would show up as a shift
in the household wealth distribution, because two $20,000 observations
replace one $40,000 observation. Constructing the distributions using per-
son weights, and assuming married couples share wealth equally, would
have shown two $20,000 observations in both years. That could have some
impact on the basic observations about how wealth changed across groups,
but it also could be important for distinguishing between the effects of
changes in lifetime earnings and changes in marital status.
What are the implications for life-cycle saving theory? Some of the
most compelling evidence in favor of life-cycle saving models comes from
simulation exercises. The approach is to specify and solve a recursive util-
ity maximizing model using dynamic programming methods, and then sim-
ulate consumption and wealth accumulation for a representative sample and
evaluate how well the predicted behavior matches reality. The literature
shows that fairly parsimonious models generate savings patterns that match
the overall distribution of wealth at given points in time, typical age-wealth
trajectories, aggregate consumption responses to changes in income, and
even differences in wealth holdings within a micro sample.
In the spirit of this literature, one way to analyze the implications of the
Gale and Pence findings would be to solve and simulate a model once using
a 1989 state of the world and again using a 2001 state of the world, and then
observe under what conditions the divergent shifts in wealth across age
groups would be predicted. I think the standard model would do a pretty
good job of predicting the divergence in wealth accumulation, but going
222 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2006
through the exercise would reveal that demographics per se did not drive
wealth accumulation, but rather lifetime earnings, which (in this case) is
highly correlated with demographics. It would be very useful to try to sepa-
rate the lifetime income and demographic effects, because that is how the
important messages for life-cycle model development could be distilled.
Data on lifetime earnings from Social Security earnings records (obtained
via the Congressional Budget Office microsimulation model) are consistent
with a lifetime earnings story. I computed average cumulative real earnings
for each age group as of 1989 and 2001 and found exactly the same pattern
that the authors found for wealth. For the youngest age group that the authors
study, those aged 25–34, the data showed very little change in cumulative
real earnings between 1989 and 2001. For the next two age groups, those
aged 35–44 and 45–54, earnings growth over the period was positive but
fairly modest, at about 11 percent. For the 65–74 age group earnings growth
over the same period was much higher, at about 46 percent. Every age group
grew richer in absolute terms over the twelve-year period, but the oldest
groups grew relatively much richer in a lifetime sense.
This differential growth was almost certainly related to some of the
demographic variables that the authors focus on to explain wealth change,
particularly education and labor force participation. The earnings differ-
ences are probably also related to health status, but it is not clear whether
low earnings cause bad health or bad health causes low earnings (probably
both are true). But in addition to the demographic variables that the authors
focus on for explaining wealth, some unexplained cohort effects show up in
the earnings data. For example, the data show that baby-boomer males have
had (holding education constant) lower relative earnings than their fathers.
The life-cycle model suggests that wealth at any given age should
increase with lifetime earnings, holding fixed the other inputs such as the
Social Security benefit formula, expected earnings growth, and expected
rates of return on financial assets. Thus the lifetime earnings data and an
unchanged macroeconomic and policy environment are basically consis-
tent with the observed differences in wealth over time. There is perhaps a
little more explaining to do, because the wealth of younger age groups was
constant whereas lifetime earnings went up modestly, but that could be
attributable to increases in person-level earnings being offset by changes
in household composition. More of the young were single in 2001 than in
1989, and given the authors’ decision to tabulate the data on a household
basis, that shifts the wealth distribution in a way that offsets the increased
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2. Gale and Sabelhaus (1999).
lifetime earnings. This shows up in the authors’ analysis as an effect of
marriage, but it could actually be an artifact of how the data are tabulated.
The lifetime earnings data and the wealth change data give consistent
results, which is good news for the life-cycle model but also suggests that
the effect of demographics on wealth can and should be explored more
deeply. Suppose one used the authors’ framework to predict future wealth:
if demographic characteristics stay the same but higher productivity lifts
lifetime earnings across all age groups, the empirical approach in the paper
predicts that wealth will remain constant, which is contrary to life-cycle
theory. The authors have identified an important reduced-form relationship
for this period of time, but the insights for life-cycle models remain buried.
Uncovering those insights will require decomposing the effects of demo-
graphics on lifetime earnings, and then looking for any residual unexplained
changes in wealth across age groups and time.
The role of capital gains. The authors’ analysis of the role of capital
gains in wealth seems intended to respond to the following argument: The
reason wealth rose for the older age groups in the 1990s is that capital
gains were unusually large. The older groups in the population hold most
of the wealth at any point in time, and so the basic findings could just be a
natural consequence of these unusual gains. However, given my belief that
the empirical regularity uncovered by the authors is explainable by basic
life-cycle theory, I am in league with the authors in rejecting that argu-
ment. In addition, I have a few comments about the role of gains that fur-
ther explore what these empirical findings imply for life-cycle behavior.
One response to the unusual-gains argument is that, in retrospect, it is
not even clear how unusual the period 1989 to 2001 really was. Certainly
stock market gains were strong in the latter part of the period, but total
asset revaluations relative to income were only marginally higher than in
the 1980–89 period.2 The stock market gains were offset in part because
gains on housing, especially early in the period, were more modest than in
the past. Since 2000 there has been a shift back toward gains on tangible
assets, with increased housing values of course leading the way.
It seems that, when thinking about the effect of capital gains on saving,
the real questions are, How much should one expect asset values to change
over time? How should people react to those changes? And how did people
actually react when historical revaluations differed from expectations?
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The idea is to construct a benchmark against which to compare actual wealth
accumulation behavior, and then try to infer what effect capital gains have
on saving. The authors estimate how much of the overall wealth change is
accounted for by gains, but there is nothing to compare those numbers
against. The simplest life-cycle model suggests that consumption of any
unexpected gains (with no mean reversion) should be smoothed over the
remaining lifetime, which suggests that older people would consume a lot
more of their gains. On the other hand, the buffer-stock variant of the basic
model suggests that younger agents may be more likely than older agents
to spend capital gains, because of the tension between high discount rates
and expected future income.
The best way to disentangle the effects of gains on behavior would be to
use high-quality panel data, but such data do not exist. The second-best
way would be to have high-quality synthetic-panel data, but the Survey of
Consumer Finances is conducted on a fairly small sample, and synthetic-
panel inferences are confounded by sampling variability. Another alterna-
tive, which ties back to the more general comments above, is to try to
develop a life-cycle simulation model that would predict the observed
changes in wealth accumulation across groups during this or other time
periods, using actual capital gains as an input. That may be the best way to
further draw insights from these very interesting empirical findings.
General discussion: Several panelists were surprised at the authors’ find-
ing that the extraordinary capital gains of the 1990s did not appear to have
altered the relationship between demographic factors and wealth. Henry
Aaron observed that wealth accumulation for each cohort is a product of
lifetime experiences over roughly four decades. It is therefore important to
take into consideration differences in external events over the entire adult
lifetime of the various cohorts, not just the one decade studied by the
authors. But the fact that the older age groups in 1989 would have been in
the prime of their working lives and accumulating assets in the 1970s,
when the stock market was performing poorly, adds to the puzzle.
Robert Gordon agreed with Aaron on the need to consider a longer time
period, and he explored the reasons why the net worth of today’s 50-year-
olds is vastly greater than that of their parents, even when they have had
similar real income streams in their working years. First, the parent’s gen-
eration’s peak earnings occurred during roughly 1965–82, a period when
the stock market contributed little to their wealth compared with what
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happened in the following two decades. Moreover, the shift toward defined-
contribution pension plans has allowed the younger generation to enjoy
enormous capital gains, which their employers would have retained under
defined-benefit plans. He suggested that the increasing use of mutual funds,
which allow individuals to better optimize their portfolios, has also been
important. However, speculating that the extraordinary capital gains of the
1980s and 1990s will not be repeated, Gordon doubted that future genera-
tions would be able to accumulate comparable net worth.
Jeffrey Brown observed that even though these factors had affected dif-
ferent cohorts differently, the wealth-to-income ratio for given age brackets
remained remarkably stable between 1983 and 2001 in the Survey of Con-
sumer Finances data, consistent with the paper’s conclusions. James Due-
senberry noted that the wealth tables stop at the 90th percentile, but a large
fraction of capital gains goes to the top 10 percent and is thus not reported.
Duesenberry also stressed the importance of intergenerational transfers
and suggested that the desire to pass wealth to their children may influ-
ence the behavior of the elderly. Richard Cooper was also interested in the
quantitative importance of bequests and observed that they may influence
the behavior of the younger as well as the older generation. For example,
30-year-olds whose parents and grandparents are quite well off may antic-
ipate bequests and consequently save less than they might otherwise.
Benjamin Friedman noted that bequests are extremely concentrated in the
upper tail of the distribution, and that if they played an important role in
the behavior of the older generations, one would expect to see significant
differences between the 75th and the 90th percentile; this, however, does
not appear to be the case in the authors’ figures.
Friedman agreed with Alan Blinder that married, educated, and healthy
individuals may make better portfolio allocations than others. But what
might be more important is that these individuals have higher incomes and
therefore higher saving in the first place. Hence they would have benefited
from large capital gains in the 1990s and would have done unusually well
even if they did not make superior portfolio allocations. Friedman and
Aaron both suggested that demographic characteristics such as education
may have an important effect on the saving rate even given income.
Cooper thought the paper’s most striking result was the absence of an
increase in net worth for the three youngest cohorts. Noting that the young
accumulated more consumer durables over the 1990s than had previous
generations, he wondered whether the inclusion of consumer durables other
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than those captured in the authors’ measures would have altered the results.
Cooper also observed that the consumption patterns of people over age 70
are considerably different from those of 30-year-olds, and he suggested
using age-specific deflators. Gordon agreed with Cooper and noted that the
consumer price index for consumer durables is more likely to be biased
upward than that for any other category. Gordon also noted that although
behavior with respect to consumer durables and several other asset cate-
gories fits the life-cycle model, with holdings increasing and then declining
with age, some categories show no decline with age, which is inconsistent
with the model.
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